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Rob Verhofstad
Introduction:
Comparative Perspectives on the Cold War
We share the same biology 
Regardless of ideology 
What might save us, me, and you 
Is if the Russians love their children too1
Introduction
Most students today taking classes on the Cold War were either very young or 
not yet born when the Berlin Wall fell. However, their lecturers and the authors of 
their textbooks remember this historical event very well. Furthermore, they most 
likely have an active recollection about the Cold War era preceding it. What this 
recollection contains—from what may be considered important events or defining 
moments to how they felt at a certain time—often depends on where the lecturer or 
author was born. For example, the Cold War perspective from a scholar born in the 
United States differs substantially from the recollection of a Ukrainian citizen. We 
can also find differences in perspectives within larger countries, as this collection of 
papers will show.
For more than 45 years the Cold War was an almost inescapable framework by 
which people everywhere viewed world events. Even taking into account many dif-
ferences in time, place or location, the world was seen as divided into two camps: 
the west (countries with liberal, democratic, capitalist systems) and the east (coun-
1 Sting, “Russians” in The Dream of the Blue Turtles (1985).
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tries with a socialist system and a centrally-planned economy). The governments of 
both sides used various forms of propaganda and ideological warfare throughout 
the Cold War to depict the other as a dangerous enemy inimically opposed to its 
own way of life. Too much understanding for the point of view of ‘the other side’ 
was oftentimes considered politically incorrect and frequently interpreted as unpa-
triotic, if not downright illegal in some cases. Enemy images were created and used 
as a source of forming an opinion instead of real experience with, or knowledge 
about ‘the other side’.
However, the Cold War era cannot be seen as a monomorphous period. The 
forms of propaganda and ideological warfare in the early Cold War years were dif-
ferent from those in the period of Détente and again different from those at the 
end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, taking into account these developments, we can 
recognize a series of images of  “the other side” which became almost second nature 
for people in societies on both sides and making it practically impossible for anyone 
to have an impartial perspective on the Cold War.
The project ‘Multilateral Comparison of Cold War Perspectives’ focuses on the 
inevitability of subjective biased perspectives on the Cold War depending on the 
origin and timeframe of the scholar studying the Cold War. Therefore we have start-
ed to bundle competing perspectives. This volume contains the Cold War perspec-
tives from respectively the United States, the Netherlands, Poland and the Soviet 
Union. These articles served as the texts used for a Conference held at Radboud 
University Nijmegen in March 2009. Students who participated in this conference 
contributed to the project by presenting their results of the Conference assignment. 
All students analyzed an example of news coverage (article or video footage) about 
a Cold War event in their home country. They tried to place the news coverage in 
its political context and focused on the question how and to what extent the news 
was biased or not. Besides making this analysis, students interviewed a person from 
their home country about one or more Cold War event. Interviewees had different 
backgrounds, like a high school teacher, a diplomat, an air force pilot, or a peace 
movement volunteer. Students covered topics like: Reagan’s Strategic Defense Ini-
tiative, the Iranian Hostage Crisis, Polish Propaganda Movies, French withdrawal 
from NATO in 1966, the Cold War through the eyes of the American Peace Move-
ment, the 1956 Budapest Uprising, etc.
In total, 39 students participated, originating from 14 different countries (the 
United States, Spain, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Den-
mark, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary and Greece).
As part of its ongoing plans, the project will entail similar conferences in the 
near future, delivering more news analysis and more interview reports in order to 
enrich the project database. The project aims at a broad representation of perspec-
tives. Therefore we will be looking for students and scholars from various countries 
to participate in this project.
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This compilation of articles forms the basis from which we started. It is written 
by five scholars, each focusing on the Cold War from the perspective of their home 
country.
Jaclyn Stanke, Lee Trepanier and Maryna Bessonova (Soviet Union/Ukraine) 
focus on the perceptions of the Cold War’s main participants, the Soviet Union 
and the United States (with Trepanier focusing on a Northern view with a study of 
Michigan and Stanke focusing on the Southern view). Spasimir Domaradzki and 
Rob Verhofstad take on the perspective of Cold War junior partners, with Doma- 
radzki and Verhofstad focusing on Poland and the Netherlands respectively.
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Rob Verhofstad
The Netherlands During The Cold War:
an Ambivalent Friendship and a Firm Enmity
The Cold War caused quite some fear in the Netherlands. Maybe not right after 
the end of the Second World War when the Dutch population was pre-occupied with 
rebuilding the country after five years of devastation. Poverty was the main enemy in 
these first years, and the fear of a reviving Germany. However, after the Berlin Blockade 
in 1948 and the overthrow of the Czechoslovakian government by the Soviets in the 
same year, the fear of the Communist enemy grew. The callous crush of the Budapest 
uprising revealed the seriousness of the eminent threats upon the Netherlands. Dutch 
foreign policy dangled between protecting its interests in their disengaging colonies and 
defending against new threats. The Dutch found the United States against them while it 
was finding a new relationship with its former colonies. At the same time they underesti-
mated the indispensability of the United States as a leader of the Western bloc. 
How the Cold War arrived in the Netherlands
The Second World War made it clear to everyone in the Netherlands that pre-
war foreign policy needed to be changed. Before Germany invaded the Netherlands 
in 1940, the Dutch relied on its neutral position in Europe. This position was based 
on the assumption that the balance of power between the United Kingdom, Ger-
many and France would prevent any of these Great Powers from invading the Neth-
erlands. After all, none other powers would grant another Great Power permission 
to acquire the Netherlands. It also became clear that the last line of Dutch defense: 
inundation of polders became practically worthless after the introduction of air 
force as a main military operation. 
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Already during the Second World War the United States proved to be the stron-
gest nation in the world not only militarily, but economically as well. The Soviet 
Union posed itself as the other world power, whereas the European Great Powers 
had to acknowledge that their dominion had severely decreased.
Dutch neutrality had to be discarded. Instead, the Netherlands had to adopt 
a new foreign policy reckoning with the new balance of power. Clearly the Dutch 
were not keen on leaning towards the Soviet Union. Before the War broke out, the 
Dutch were very disapproving of the Soviet Union and of Communism in gener-
al. The critical attitude toward Communism was somewhat mitigated because of 
the eminent role Communists played in the resistance against the Nazis. This gave 
Communism and the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) some credits. In 
the first parliamentary elections after the Second World War in 1946, the CPN got 
more than 10% of the seats in the Second Chamber. Never before and never again, 
would they have such massive support. Despite lenience toward Communism in 
the first years after the War, the preponderant feeling was that the Dutch had to 
rely on an Atlantic orientation, focusing on United States leadership. Parallel to this 
Atlantic orientation, the Dutch invested in European economic cooperation as they 
became one of the six founding fathers of European Integration.
Right after Germany and Japan were defeated there was no necessity for a coali-
tion between the United States and the Soviet Union. The conflict of interest and 
the ideological contradistinction between the superpowers became increasingly ap-
parent. Europe was divided into two spheres of influence with an Iron Curtain in 
between. The introduction of the Marshall Plan (officially the European Recovery 
Program) cemented the Netherlands distinctively into the western sphere of in-
fluence. In total the Dutch received more than 1,100 million dollars in aid from 
the United States. This economic assistance in addition to Dutch gratitude for the 
American role in liberating the Netherlands from the German occupation formed 
the basis of a long-lasting alliance.
The Berlin blockade of 1948 and the overthrow of the democratic government in 
Czechoslovakia by Communist one-party rule in the same year led to an increased 
fear of Communism in the Netherlands. Indeed, it fostered the support for the 
Treaty of Brussels as a bulwark against the Communist threat and it was a precursor 
to NATO in which the Netherlands participated since its foundation in 1949.
Protection against the Red Threat
NATO was the main line of defense for the Netherlands ever since its founda-
tion in 1949. The Netherlands seemed to have no problems with the leading role the 
United States took right from the start. Within the Netherlands there had not been 
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much discussion about joining NATO. With the exception of CPN all political par-
ties supported ratification. The fact that the Dutch defense was now imbedded in 
a North Atlantic defense strategy did not mean that there were no disagreements. 
The United States had decided in the late 40s that the western allies would not be 
able to hold off the Red Army in case they would start a conventional attack. There-
fore, the U.S. proposed a strategy of ‘Peripheral Defense’. This implied that the allied 
troops would gradually retreat behind the Rhine, and hold out until the moment the 
Red Army arrived. Conventional warfare would be avoided by a further retreating to 
the United Kingdom. The Netherlands did not want to sacrifice the entire country 
and thought that an alternative defense line had to be developed. In 1951 the Nether-
lands, therefore, started to build the IJssel-line: a large scale waterway infrastructure 
project using the well-tried technique of inundation. The idea was to dam the main 
rivers Waal and Neder-Rijn in case the Red Army attempted to undertake a conven-
tional attack. By damming the main rivers, the water could be pushed through the 
river IJssel leading to the IJsselmeer. The river IJssel unable to absorb the enormous 
amount of water, would flood. The infrastructural project would imply numerous 
landscape interventions like dikes and inlets to materialize expanses of water of the 
right depth: on the one hand not too shallow so as to prevent tanks from crossing, on 
the other hand not too deep so as to prevent ships from sailing across. 
The Soviet Union soon found out about this new defense structure while the 
large majority of the Dutch population only learned about the IJssel-line long after 
it was dismantled in the early 1960s. 
An ambivalent relation with the United States
The standard characterization of the Dutch post-war foreign policy is that they 
were very staunch allies of the United States. A good example of this is the informa-
tion movie by Kees Stip that was broadcast by the Dutch Government in 1955. The 
movie was called: ‘Wij leven vrij’ (‘we live in freedom’). In a somewhat cynical tone 
it holds up the fundamental differences between the Netherlands as a free country 
and ‘certain other countries’ evidently referring to the Soviet Union and its satellite 
states. At the end of the movie the conclusion is that the western countries had to 
unite to fight this threat explicitly referring to the Brussels Treaty and NATO. It 
also calls for understanding the need for major and long-lasting sacrifices for fund-
ing the military obligations the country had as a NATO-member.
Already from the start of NATO the Dutch share in NATO’s defense expendi-
tures was relatively high compared to that of other smaller member states. Further-
more, the Dutch always showed themselves as an opponent to the development of 
an European defense organization apart from NATO as wished by some of large 
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European nations. Rather, the Netherlands focused on a strong Atlantic alliance 
and was even prepared to fully hand over the decision on a nuclear attack to Wash-
ington. The Dutch were also one the few nations that supported the United States 
in the United Nations operation during the Korean War.
All this points at a high level of trust in the new forms of international coop-
eration like NATO in order to turn the Soviet threat. But at the same time a very 
ponderous relation arose with the United States.
Diverging ideas about colonialism formed the origin of this controversy. After 
World War II had ended, the Dutch were very keen on regaining control over their 
colony, Dutch East Indies. The Dutch thought that this colony was pivotal for their 
economy. The slogan ‘Indie verloren, rampspoed geboren!’ (‘Indies gone, prosperity 
done’) was extremely popular in the Netherlands and describes well how strongly 
the Dutch people thought about keeping control over their colonies.
In 1945, when Japan was defeated, the nationalist leader Sukarno declared in-
dependence. In 1947–1948 the Dutch undertook military operations euphemisti-
cally referred to as ‘Politionele Acties’1 in an attempt to regain control. The military 
operations were an enormous financial burden for the Netherlands. Furthermore, it 
led to an extremely isolated position since many countries disapproved of the Dutch 
position. The United States was very clear in criticizing the Netherlands and in sup-
porting the Indonesian opposition. Moreover, the United States put much pressure 
on the Netherlands by linking the continuation of Marshall-help to their behavior 
in Indonesia. The Netherlands gave in to international pressure and agreed by sign-
ing the declaration of independence of Indonesia in 1949. 
However, strife between the Netherlands and Indonesia continued even after 
the formal independence. One of the remaining conflicts was the status of New 
Guinea. The Netherlands refused to renunciate, which led an enduring diplomatic 
conflict with the United States2.
The Dutch position even hardened in 1952 when Joseph Luns became one of 
the two Dutch Ministers of Foreign Affairs3. Luns took a tougher stance by empha-
sizing that the Dutch interests in the East should not be squandered. The public 
opinion abundantly supported Luns in this and shared his critical attitude towards 
the United States. The relation even worsened when Indonesia’s President Sukarno 
received a most exuberant reception in Washington when he visited the United 
States in 1956.
1 The term ‘Politionele Acties’ could be translated as ‘police actions’. This term is euphemistical because in fact 
there were many tens of  thousands soldiers—not policemen—fighting the Indonesian Republican Troops.  
2 The dispute about New Guinea dragged on till 1962, when it became part of  Indonesia.
3 In 1952, the Netherlands had two Ministers dealing with foreign affairs. Beyen mainly focused on European 
politics, whereas Luns would take care of  Atlantic affairs and former colonies. Reason for this unique construc-
tion was the fear of  some parties that European politics would be dominated by Catholics only. Therefore they 
did not want the Catholic Luns on that post. Consequently Beyen was added to the team as a non-partisan. 
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The Suez Crisis in 1956 again led to tension between the United States and the 
Netherlands as the Dutch chose sides with France and the United Kingdom. The 
United States heavily protested against the military operations carried out by Israel, 
the UK and France in Egypt as a reaction to Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez 
Canal. The United States blamed France and the UK of acting in a neo-colonial way 
and pressured them to withdraw. After the Suez Crisis had ended, the lesson could 
be drawn that old colonial powers like France and the UK were unable to indepen-
dently steer international conflicts without the United States’ consent. Throughout 
the conflict though, the Netherlands were staunchly at the side of the French and 
the UK. Reason for this outspoken position was the fact that the Dutch saw a clear 
link between what happened in Egypt and the developments in Indonesia. If na-
tionalists like the Egyptian leader Nasser got their way with nationalizing assets, this 
would set the example for President Sukarno to do the same in Indonesia thereby 
harming Dutch interests. 
1956: While Budapest burns, the Communists are dancing
Right at the moment the Suez crisis came to a climax, the Budapest uprising was 
crushed by Soviet troops. It became clear that the de-Stalinization process Khrush-
chev had started had clear limits. The Soviet Union did not allow its satellite states 
to disengage from the Soviet sphere of influence. The Hungarian intention to leave 
the Warsaw-pact was unacceptable for Moscow and led to a heavy-handed opera-
tion to restore the Soviet control over Hungary.
As in more West-European countries, this led to fierce indignation in the Nether-
lands. In several demonstrations many people loudly protested against Soviet actions. 
The anger of the protesters directed mainly toward the Dutch Communist party 
CPN and their newspaper, ‘De Waarheid’ (‘truth’). The sharpest clash occurred on 
the November 4, 1956. Protesters gathered in front of the Communist Center in Am-
sterdam, ‘Felix Meritis’. In this Amsterdam building not only the CPN had its base; it 
also housed the editors and the printing press of the newspaper ‘De Waarheid’. Right 
at the moment the protesters arrived, they could hear the music playing at the weekly 
dance-evening of the ANJV, an organization for young Communists. This infuriated 
the protesters even more: “While Budapest burns, the Communists are dancing!” 
After a few days the protests against Communism mitigated, but generally the 
Dutch attitude toward Communism hardened. Communist representatives were 
politically isolated. For a while many non-Communist members of Parliament os-
tentatiously left the Second Chamber of the Parliament when a member of the CPN 
took the word. The events in 1956 also stopped Communism from being fashion-
able. Before 1956 there were several intellectuals, artists etc. who would pose them-
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selves as Communists, but most of them distanced from the events in Budapest and 
afterward stopped labeling themselves as Communists. Nevertheless, the hard-core 
members of the CPN entrenched themselves in defending the Soviet action against 
the reactionary anti-revolutionary forces in Budapest. 
Despite massive indignation, there was not much the Dutch Government was 
doing to influence the international events taking place. It became clear that the 
Eisenhower Administration was not going to risk World War III over Budapest, 
regardless of their proclaimed strategy of Roll Back Communism. The Dutch gov-
ernment decided to boycott the Olympic Games in Melbourne taking place in that 
same year. Only two more countries (Spain and Switzerland) decided to do the 
same. Beside this boycott, however, there were no actions taken other than admit-
ting approximately 3,400 Hungarian refugees into the Netherlands.
The Dutch government and its population came to the conclusion that the Red 
Threat was not to be underestimated. The events in Budapest showed the real face 
of Communism, and therefore precautions had to be taken. The Dutch civil defense 
organization ‘Bescherming Bevolking’ (peoples protection) already established in 
1952 took a more prominent role after 1956. More than 160,000 volunteers partici-
pated in drills and preparations for a possible attack by the Red Army. They focused 
on a nuclear attack. At that time, but even more afterwards there was quite some 
criticism about the real effect these actions would have in case of an attack. Perhaps 
the actions of Bescherming Bevolking primarily functioned as a comforter rather 
than an effective defense or rescue method. 
Vietnam protests in the Netherlands: Johnson Miller!
In April 1966 a protest song ‘Welterusten Mijnheer de President’ (Goodnight 
Mr. President) written by Lennaert Nijgh and sung by a protest singer Boudewijn 
de Groot entered the charts. It is cynically addressed (to) President Johnson of the 
United States asking him if he slept well at night knowing what goes on in Vietnam. 
It became an extremely popular protest song and was a prelude to the massive pro-
tests against the U.S. war against North-Vietnam. 
The Dutch government officially backed the United States in their Vietnam 
strategy, but never gave in to requests by the United States to send Dutch troops to 
Vietnam. The Dutch government and especially Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns 
had not forgotten about the American opposition in the debate about Indonesia. 
They surely were not keen on saving the Americans now in this other Asian country. 
The government kept an ambivalent attitude towards the United States. 
The Dutch popular protest grew; more people resented the Vietnam War and 
especially the role that the United States played in it. The protests against Vietnam 
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coincided with the general protests by leftist people against the political establish-
ment. A tide of political renewal changed the political landscape. New political par-
ties appeared and the protest generation of the sixties made itself heard. The police 
did not know exactly how to deal with these protests. When protesters chanted that 
Johnson was a murderer, the police arrested protesters for insulting a befriended 
Head of State. Consequently, the protesters changed their slogan from Johnson 
Moordenaar ( Johnson killer) into Johnson Molenaar ( Johnson miller).  This con-
fused the authorities who had a hard time adjusting to the 60s anyway. Despite the 
sometimes spectacular demonstrations and cultural manifestations, there was only 
a very limited influence on the general public. The demonstrations were relatively 
small scaled with no more than 15,000 people at its peak. Furthermore, in 1968 
there was still a vast majority (65%) of the Dutch population who thought that the 
American presence in Vietnam was justified. 
The second wave of anti-Vietnam demonstrations occurred in 1972 as a reaction 
to the ‘Christmas Bombardments’ as they were called. On that occasion more than 
50,000 people demonstrated against the Nixon Administration.4  This second wave 
of demonstrations coincided with a new generation of Foreign Ministers. Luns had 
been the Foreign Minister from 1956 until 1971. Throughout these years, he em-
bodied the ambivalence felt toward the United States. He had had fierce disputes 
with the United States about Indonesia, New Guinea and the Suez Crisis. At the 
same time, however, he was always very clear in his position that the Netherlands 
needed the United States as an ally. Despite the conflicts he had with the United 
States, he made it very clear that ultimately the Dutch would support them. This 
was also the reason for him to refuse more than once to convey the protest of the 
Dutch Parliament about the Vietnam War to the U.S. President. Luns’ successors 
at Foreign Affairs, Mr. Schmelzer and even more Mr. van der Stoel, changed the 
Dutch relationship with the United States. These Ministers were not very hesitant 
in voicing the Dutch Parliament’s widespread disapproval about Vietnam. Further-
more, the Social Democratic Minister van der Stoel alienated the Americans even 
more by the decision to provide development aid to countries, like Cuba, regarded 
as unfriendly towards the United States. 
Rather a Russian in my kitchen…
Despite President Carter’s original point of departure, the arms race increased 
during his Presidency. Around 1976 the Soviets had installed numerous SS-20 nu-
clear missiles on several missile sites spread over Eastern European countries. These 
missiles were aimed at Western Europe. In 1979 NATO decided to deploy missiles 
4 Some estimates even assume there were up to 100,000 protesters participating in the demonstrations.
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in Western Europe in attempt to counter these Soviet SS-20 missiles. The NATO 
asked the Dutch government to allow missiles to be placed on the Dutch territory 
as well. The Dutch government had no objections, but the public protests were of 
an unprecedented scale, more than 550,000 demonstrators at its peak on October 
29, 1983. More than 3.75 million people, a quarter of the population, signed the 
petition against the missile placements. These demonstrations did not necessarily 
protest against the United States, but more against the Dutch government blindly 
following a NATO-request, rather than listening to its citizens. However, despite 
the criticism about the missiles deployment, the Dutch population still backed 
NATO-membership. Even in 1983, when the protests peaked, no more than 20% 
of the population favored leaving the alliance.
Contrary to the anti-Vietnam protests in the 60s and 70s, public opinion now 
deviated strongly from the position the government took. The massive protests re-
sulted in a very long decision-making process. The Dutch consensus style prevented 
the Dutch government from simply making a decision against the will of a major-
ity of the population, but on the other hand did not want to let down the other 
NATO-members either. They were particularly sensitive to the disapproval from 
the United States. The Dutch Government announced that they would need much 
time to make a final decision. The NATO granted the Netherlands 2 more years to 
come to a conclusion. 
Domestically the decision about placing the missiles caused quite some po-
litical turmoil. Formerly, especially before the 70s, foreign policy had not been 
a prominent politicized issue. But more and more a distinction between ‘right’ and 
‘left’ positions emerged when it was about foreign policy. The ‘right’ political par-
ties inclined toward warm relationships with the United States and strong support 
for NATO, whereas the ‘left’ political parties were far more critical of the Atlantic 
alliance. This demarcation line sometimes even split political parties, like the So-
cial Democratic party where the more Atlantic oriented members fiercely disagreed 
with the more progressive wing. Within the newly merged Christian Democratic 
Party the conservative party line clashed with the more evangelical branches linked 
to the Peace Movement. Ever since the 70s the Parliament took a more proactive 
role in the foreign policy of the Netherlands.
Beside the heated discussions in the political discourse, it also had its manifesta-
tion on a cultural level. Protest singer, Armand, wrote a song in which he proclaimed 
he would rather share his country with the Russians (Soviets) than live in a garri-
son state. His slogan ‘Liever een Rus in m’n keuken dan een raket m’n tuin’ (rather 
a Russian in my kitchen than a missile in my back yard) was often used in the nu-
merous peace-demonstrations in the 80s. Then by the end of 1982 pop group ‘Doe 
Maar’ had a number 1-hit with ‘De Bom’ (The Bomb) with the underlying message: 
What’s the point of making a career, doing your homework when a nuclear bomb 
can drop at any moment?’ These songs reflect the grim world view many people 
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tended to have those days because of the dead-end arms race taking place between 
the super powers. The hit ‘Over de Muur’ (Across the Wall) by ‘Klein Orkest’ in 
1986 points at the absurd division of Berlin by a wall and claims that both sides are 
kept hostage by their own system. In most of the cultural expressions of the eighties, 
the anger and incomprehension did not focus on the Soviets as the declared enemy 
but rather on the undefined systems that kept the Cold War going on. Songs and 
other cultural outlets, express the fear that mankind will not be able to control the 
enormous and ever increasing armory which one day might destroy us all. 
Nevertheless, public opinion surveys show that in the late 70s and 80s nuclear 
weapons and East-West relations in general had little priority.5 Domestic problems in 
the field of social and economic policy scored (a) far higher on the list of priorities.
Due to this complex domestic debate, two years were not enough to find a con-
sensus in the Netherlands. This frustrated the other NATO-members who called 
this inability to make a decision ‘Hollanditis.’ Finally, Ruud Lubbers, the Dutch 
Prime Minister at the time, came up with the solution: the Netherlands would re-
ject the NATO missiles in case the Soviets did not increase their number of SS-20 
missiles by 1 November 1985. Only if the Soviets had increased their number of 
missiles, the Netherlands would have placed the cruise missiles. This led to disbelief 
and incomprehension among the western allies as this meant that it was now Mos-
cow who would decide if the Dutch would place NATO-missiles or not. Thanks to 
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed by Reagan and Gorbachev in 
1987 the missiles were never actually placed. 
By the time it became clear that the Eastern European nations were disengaging 
from the Soviet Union (1989) succeeded by the implosion of the Soviet Union it-
self  (1991), the Netherlands was solidly back to its irrefutable Atlantic orientation. 
Once more the Dutch posed themselves against a European defense organization 
loose from NATO. This was a prelude to the Dutch foreign policy in the post-Cold 
War period. 
Conclusion: A policy of  fear
One main characteristics of the Cold War was that it divided the world into two 
spheres of influence. Throughout all the Cold War years it was clear that the Nether-
lands always belonged to the western camp, with the United States as its hegemonic 
leader. Nevertheless, this did not mean that the Netherlands uncritically followed 
the United States in all cases. During the period right after World War II until the 
beginning of the 50s, there had been many serious disputes about the decoloniza-
5 R.C. Eichenberg, The Myth of  Hollanditis, “International Security” 1983 (Vol. 8, No. 2), referring to NIPO-
surveys for public opinion 1977 to 1982.
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tion of Indonesia and New Guinea, and about the position the Dutch took in the 
Suez crisis.
However, these disputes were always overshadowed by a more serious hazard: the 
threat of a Red Army invasion. For the Dutch it was very clear that without the sup-
port of the United States Europe was defenseless against the Soviet Union. Therefore, 
the Atlantic Alliance was indispensable. Additionally, the good relationship with the 
United States was also supportive for the power balance in Europe. Logically, a small 
nation like the Netherlands was afraid of domination by the great European powers. 
In respect of this, a powerful friend overseas was most instrumental. Lastly, the Dutch 
never forgot their gratitude toward the Americans for playing a pivotal role in liberat-
ing their country in World War II and for their Marshall Help. 
Through the years, the fear of a Communist conquest increased and with it 
the fundamental choice of the Western camp, while the consensus about Dutch 
foreign policy decreased. From the 70s onward, the Dutch foreign policy became 
a domestic political issue. Discussion about the Atlantic Alliance mounted, and the 
discord split the public and it even split political parties. Nevertheless, even during 
the peak of protests against the placement of missiles in 1983, the public support of 
the Atlantic Alliance was never fundamentally questioned by the majority of (the) 
population, not even by the sizeable minority. 
At times the Dutch government must have signed for the complex decisions that 
had to be made concerning their foreign policy. But the real foreign policy brain 
twisters emerged only after Moscow stopped being a conceivable threat to the West. 
It then became clear that the Dutch foreign policy throughout the Cold War had 
been guided by fear: fear of the Soviet Union, and that new guidelines had to be 
found or developed for the Post Cold War period.
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Spasimir Domaradzki
The Polish Perspective of  American Foreign Policy:
Selected Moments from the Cold War Era
Introduction
Bipolarity in international relations was the main characteristic of the Cold War 
Era. The world was divided between two opposing political, economic and mili-
tary blocs. The Soviet Union installed communist regimes in most of the European 
countries after the Second World War in Central and Eastern Europe. This process 
was condemned by the United States and its Western European allies, but little was 
done to oppose the process of installment of pro-Soviet governments. Eventually, in 
1947, President Harry Truman initiated the policy of containment which aimed at 
preventing Greece and Turkey from falling into the sphere of Soviet influence. This 
policy also included a significant financial contribution for the reconstruction of 
a destroyed Europe. Though the range of the Marshall Plan was intended to include 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, these two countries rejected the offer. In this decision 
they had been strongly influenced by Moscow which offered financial and material 
contributions for the reconstruction of countries from Central Europe. Steadily the 
world was splitting into two parts, divided by different political, ideological, eco-
nomic and social approaches.
Who rules in Poland?  
Or, how the country became a Soviet satellite
During the process of formation of the post World War II order, Poland’s destiny 
became one of the elements in the geopolitical puzzle. The situation on the battle-
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field in Europe directly influenced the negotiations between the allies. Although 
the Third Reich was defeated on all fronts, it appeared that even the issue of who 
would enter Berlin first became an important strategic goal. It was perceived as an 
argument for stronger claims concerning Europe’s future.
The Soviet army went through Poland on its way to Berlin. In July 1944 Joseph 
Stalin promoted the installment of the Polish Committee of National Liberation.1 
The structure of this Communist-appointed provisional government was created 
in Moscow. Stalin’s idea was to establish a new status quo, one which would weak-
en the position of the Polish government in exile (in London) and give Moscow 
a stronger position during the negotiations on the future of Europe. On August 
1, 1944, the Warsaw uprising led by the Home Army (Armia Krajowa) began.2 Its 
aim was to liberate the Polish capital from German forces before the arrival of the 
Soviet army. In order to prevent its success, Stalin ordered the Red Army to stop 
on the right bank of the Vistula River and to wait until the defeat of the last Home 
Army units. The consequences for the city and its inhabitants were terrifying. The 
Germans ruined approximately 90% of the city and the casualties are estimated at 
around 150,000–200,000.
During the “Big Three” meeting in Yalta, the Polish question was one of the 
important issues concerning the postwar future.3 The final declaration revealed the 
compromise made between Winston Churchill, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and 
Joseph Stalin on that matter. The provisions of the declaration concerning Poland 
started with the statement that Poland was liberated by the Red Army, but also 
required the establishment of a Polish provisional government broader in its scope 
than the already existing Polish Committee of National Liberation.4 The Commis-
sion of Good Services (as W. Roszkowski calls it), consisting of representatives from 
the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain (Viacheslav Molotov, Averell 
Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr), was supposed to oversee the changes in 
the PCNL such that the provisional government would include Poles in exile and 
those from the territories to be liberated. Stalin agreed to free elections (which were 
never held).5 Upon Soviet request it was decided that only democratic and anti-
Nazi parties could participate. 
1  The first official headquarters of  the Polish Committee of  National Liberation (PCNL) was established in 
Lublin on August 1, 1944. The PCNL claimed to be the only legal representative of  the Poles and proposed 
radical social, economic and political changes.
2  More information about the Home Army and the Warsaw uprising can be found at: http://www.warsawu-
prising.com/ (accessed March 3, 2009).
3  W. Roszkowski, Półwiecze. Historia polityczna świata po 1945 r. (Warszawa: PWN, 2002), 14.
4  Provision VII of  the Yalta Conference Declaration. The whole text is available at: http://www.taiwandocu-
ments.org/yalta.htm (accessed March 3, 2009).
5  In 1947, parliamentary elections were held in Poland, but they were never recognized as free and fair by the 
United States and Great Britain. More on this issue below in text.
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This vague description later allowed the Soviets to manipulate the political situ-
ation in Poland.6 
These arbitrary decisions were in clear violation of the principles of the Atlan-
tic charter, signed by W. Churchill and F. D. Roosevelt on August 12, 1941, two 
of which directly concerned the situation of countries like Poland.7 The provisions 
stated that no territorial changes were to be made without the consent of the coun-
tries concerned and that the rights to self-determination and form of government 
should be respected.8 This idealistic approach was subsequently replaced by the 
Western allies with a much more pragmatic stance.
The idea behind the establishment of the Polish Provisional Government of Na-
tional Unity was that it would receive the recognition of all the members of the 
“Big Three”. Although all the participants at Yalta agreed to this, each interpreted 
the conclusions in its own way. The Soviet Union had achieved de facto control 
over Poland by diminishing the role of the Polish government in exile. The rela-
tions between them were cold since the discovery of the mass graves of Polish police 
and army members in the Katyn Forest in 1943. The Polish government-in-exile 
requested an international commission of the Red Cross to examine the case. The 
final report suggested that the mass murder was committed by the Soviet NKVD 
(Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs). Bearing in mind the importance of re-
lations with Moscow at the time, Washington and London estimated that it was 
more important to decrease the level of support for the Polish government in Lon-
don than to confront Stalin on that particular matter. Since a new effective power 
appeared in Poland with the introduction in 1944 of the PCNL, the Soviet Union 
managed to decrease further the role of the Polish government in exile—even in the 
eyes of the Western allies. The fact that the PCNL was created in Moscow was less 
important.
With the recognition of the fait accompli in Eastern Europe, Washington and 
London paid the price for the involvement of the Red army in the war with Japan.9 
Yalta became the symbol of the new world order. It was based on the tacit consent of 
the establishment in spheres of influence around the world. The lack of clarity in the 
Yalta decisions was useful for the Soviet Union, which interpreted the agreements 
instrumentally.10
6  M.K. Kamiński, W obliczu sowieckiego ekspansjonizmu. Polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych i Wielskiej Brytanii wobec Polski 
i Czechosłowacji 1945–1948. (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Neriton, 2005), 34.
7 W. Roszkowski, op. cit. 14.
8  Articles. 2 and 3 of  the Atlantic Charter. Text of  the document can be found at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
wwii/atlantic.asp (accessed August 3, 2008).
9  W. Roszkowski, op. cit. 14.
10  Ibid. 15.
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The territorial issue or the milestone of  Polish dependence
Slightly over two weeks after the beginning of the Second World War with the 
invasion by Germany of Poland in accordance with the agreements of the secret 
German–Russian pact (Ribbentrop–Molotov) on September 17, 1939, the Soviet 
Union invaded Poland from the East. The Polish troops were ordered not to fight 
against the Soviet Army. Still, random clashes between Polish and Soviet forces took 
place. With the end of the war activities Poland was de facto divided between Hitler 
and Stalin. The German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 invalidated 
the German–Soviet agreement on Poland. 
In the course of the war in Europe it became clear that the shape of Poland after 
the war would be an open issue. Again the principles laid in the Atlantic Char-
ter were left aside. During the conference in Teheran (November 28–December 1, 
1943) “the big three” decided the shape of the Eastern Polish border on the so called 
Curzon line without the consent of the Polish government in exile.
This concession to Stalin’s demands was the price paid for his commitment 
in other parts of the world and his obligation to support Turkey against possible 
Bulgarian attack. Stalin was aware that the results of the war on the Eastern front 
strengthened his position during the meetings with the western allies. In October 
1944 Stalin proposed that the influence of the great powers in Central Europe be 
shared among the big three in percentage. The Soviet Union was supposed to obtain 
90 % in Romania, 75 % in Bulgaria, 50 % in Yugoslavia and Hungary. As Wojciech 
Roszkowski points out rightly “…the future of Eastern Europe was determined long 
before Yalta…” The words of Churchill “…we need to remember that on the occu-
pied territories the Soviets will do more or less what they want…” are the most clear 
example of the awareness of the western allies of the real Soviet intensions.11
During the Potsdam Conference in 1945 the post war status quo in Europe was 
settled. Among the priorities were two issues: the future of Germany and the shape 
of the post war Polish state. In first place The Soviet Union, United States and Great 
Britain recognized the existing Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, 
though it was already controlled by the communists. Thus the Polish government in 
exile was passed over. Stalin proposed establishment of the western Polish border on 
Oder–Neisse line and was supported by the Polish government, which argued that 
this acquisition is needed compensation for the eastern territorial losses and was 
an indispensable area for the resettlement of 4,000,000 Poles from the territories 
gained by the Soviet Union. 
Throughout 1945 the United States and Great Britain started to recognize the 
danger of Stalin’s actions. Although Soviet involvement in the war against Japan 
11  J.F. Burnes, Roosevelt, Truman and the Origin of  the Cold War. (Chapel Hill: 1982), 42. See also: N. Davies, God’s 
Playground: A History of  Poland. (Oxford University Press 2005, Vol. 2).
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was needed, Truman and Churchill and later Clement Atlee steadily decided to de-
crease the amount of concessions to Stalin. Thus, Poland’s western border issue be-
came one of the first omens of the Cold War. The Brits, in agreement with the Pol-
ish government in exile, conditioned the recognition of the border on two issues: 
free elections in Poland and safe return for the Polish soldiers from the Western 
front. The Soviet Union adhered to these conditions aware of its full control over 
the situation in Poland. Truman though, saw Germany as the dike that could stop 
the Soviet invasion in Europe. From his point of view too weak Germany would 
not be able to hold the line. Therefore, the U.S. delegation refused to recognize the 
Polish–German border. 
Eventually, it was decided that the final shape of the Polish–German border be 
settled in the peace treaty between the two countries. This decision pushed Poland 
into the sphere of Soviet influence due to the fact that the only guarantee of Polish 
territorial integrity was Stalin and his communist principles. It also determined the 
negative attitude of the new Polish authorities toward the United States. Probably 
the most permanent priority of Warsaw for the next over forty years was to achieve 
irrefutable international recognition of its western border. This became an insepa-
rable element of the Polish foreign policy until 1989.
It would be naïve to believe that the territorial uncertainty was the only mat-
ter to push Poland into the arms of Stalin. The Polish communists needed more 
than three years to stabilize the power in their hands. They used all the methods of 
repression already tested in the Soviet Union to defeat the political opposition. In 
1946 a referendum was held with three questions constructed by the communists in 
a manner that would request approval of all three issues. The questions considered 
the abolition of the Senate (higher chamber of the Polish parliament), consolida-
tion in the future constitution of the economic system through agricultural reform 
and nationalization and the consolidation of the western border. The communists 
promoted the answer yes to all three questions.12 The referendum was held on June 
30, 1946. The results were falsified by the communists who by that time already 
controlled most of the government structures and had the support of the Polish 
Army and the Red Army on Polish territory. The government announced the of-
ficial results which gave legal basis for structural and ideological changes in Polish 
society. 
A year later parliamentary elections were held. The elections can hardly be called 
fair and democratic since the right–wing political parties were banned from partici-
pation under the accusation of being pro Nazi. This rule at least supposedly, was in 
accordance with the provisions of the “big three” conferences in Yalta and Potsdam. 
The various parties were gathered in the so called “Democratic bloc” controlled by 
the communists. According to the official results more than 80% voted for that bloc. 
12  The referendum is known in Polish history as 3xYES.
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In 1948 the communists completed the process of elimination of all political oppo-
sition with the composition of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) which 
ruled the country until 1989. Only two other parties United Agrarian Party (Zjed-
noczone Stronnictwo Ludowe) and Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne) 
were allowed to exist as a screen for the preservation of the slogan of democracy. 
Though different in name they unanimously supported the line of PUWP. 
In the peak of the Stalinism new Polish constitution was passed on July 22, 1952 
and the People’s Republic of Poland was established. The constitution was based on 
the Soviet Constitution of 1936 and introduced totally new political, social and 
economic principles in accordance with the communist ideology. The constitution 
of 1952 was only confirmation of the status quo established by the communists 
from 1945. With the third biggest army in Europe, Poland was one of the closest 
Soviet satellites and important factor in the Eastern bloc. 
Apart from the question about the ideological orientation of Poland the post 
war shape of the country became the primary topic of concern for the Polish au-
thorities. No other Eastern European country suffered so strongly the consequences 
of Stalin’s aspirations for territorial gains. As a result of the II world war Poland lost 
approximately one fourth of its territory to the Soviet Union and was moved west-
wards without any international recognition.13
Polish–American relations as derivative of  the Cold War
As it was previously mentioned, the bilateral relations between Warsaw and 
Washington during the Cold War were directly linked to the climate in the relations 
between the East and the West. The apogee of the Cold War led to the most difficult 
and gloomy relations between the United States and Poland in their history.14
Although on April 24, 1946, Poland and United States signed an agreement of 
economic and financial cooperation, the bilateral relations were deteriorating. In 
September of the same year, Secretary of State James Byrnes declared that the Ger-
man borders were still to be settled and represented the view that the territory east 
of the Oder–Neisse line was only temporarily under Polish administration.15
The process of eliminating the opposition in Poland was officially condemned 
in the United States. Neither the referendum of 1946 nor the elections of 1947 re-
sults were recognized. In response, the government in Warsaw used every occasion 
to emphasize the attempts to interfere in the Poland’s internal matters. During the 
13  In comparison to 1938 Poland lost 77,700 sq. km. W. Bonusiak, Historia Polski 1944–1989. (Rzeszów: 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, 2007), 15.
14  L. Pastusiak, Stosunki polsko-amerykańskie 1945–1955. (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2004), 12.
15  Ibid.
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conviction of members of the Home Army and other anti-communist underground 
movements, one of the often used accusations was subversive activity and coopera-
tion with Western imperialism. As a result, the economic cooperation between Po-
land and the U.S. almost disappeared. In 1951, Washington broke off the treaty on 
the basis that Warsaw had obtained the Most Favored Nation clause in 1931. 
Probably the most remarkable international initiative in which Poland was in-
volved during the period of Stalin’s rule was the selection of Poland (together with 
Czechoslovakia) to participate in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission es-
tablished on the basis of the Korean Armistice Agreement in July 1953. Since the 
sides in the Korean War had the right to nominate two neutral states, the Korean 
People’s Army and Chinese People’s Volunteers chose the People’s Republic of Po-
land. Obviously, the notion of neutrality was sifted through the sieve of ideological 
similarity.
Stalin’s death in 1953 led to the beginning of a new era. After few years of inter-
nal fights Nikita Khrushchev gained absolute control over the Soviet empire. After 
the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Union Communist Party which started the 
process of destalinization and the thaw between the U.S. and the USSR, Poland 
proposed at the United Nations the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Eu-
rope (Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany – Deutsche Demokratische Repub-
lik, also DDR) and West Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, also FRG). This 
initiative, though idealistic, also had a practical propaganda application. If accepted 
by the West, NATO would not be able to deploy nuclear weapons in Germany. 
Since the West refused to comply, the communists underlined one more time the 
militarist and aggressive attitude of NATO.
The thaw in the relations between the East and the West created the needed 
background for dialog between Warsaw and Washington DC. Nevertheless, com-
munist propaganda continued to explain every action of the United States in con-
formity with the Soviet interpretation. The novum was that the Soviet bloc substi-
tuted the concept of confrontation with the concept of peaceful coexistence. This 
boosted the bilateral relations which led to a new era in the seventies. In general, 
the seventies were the détente decade and this led to an intensification of the con-
tacts between Warsaw and Washington. Nixon’s visit to Poland in 1972 resulted in 
enhancement of economic, cultural, scientific and technological cooperation. The 
subsequent visits of high level officials (Edward Gierek to United States in 1974, 
Jimmy Carter to Poland in 1977) were unprecedented examples of the realization 
of the policy of peaceful coexistence.16 Although Poland did not miss a chance to 
declare its devotion to Moscow, the financial difficulties of the Soviet Union were 
interpreted in Warsaw (and also in other satellite capitals) as permission to search 
for other possibilities to overcome the economic disturbances. 
16  Edward Gierek was the First Secretary of  the Polish United Workers Party 1970–1980.
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The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan interrupted the trend and stiffened the posi-
tions of both sides. 
The implementation of martial law in Poland in December 1981 and the con-
demnation of this act by the Reagan administration led to the end of the process 
of cooperation. During the eighties, Washington applied the dual track approach 
toward Poland. On the one side the U.S. condemned the introduction of martial 
law and announced an embargo on Poland. The other supported the repressed and 
prosecuted opposition and sympathized with the Poles. This policy was changed 
only after the end of communism and the creation of the first non-communist gov-
ernment with Tadeusz Mazowiecki as prime minister.
The meaning of  the words
According to communist propaganda, the defeat of the West in the ideological 
clash was dependent on the solution of the eternal fight of good and evil. All initia-
tives of the Soviet bloc were described in bright, friendly and trustful words leading 
to a conviction that the good had finally ruled part of the world. Though optimis-
tic, the propaganda constantly emphasized that there was still an enemy to defeat, 
an enemy who wished to destroy and annihilate the achievements of the quest for 
equal rights and a brighter future. In the words of the famous Soviet newspaper 
Izwestija from June 22, 1972 “…Between the Soviet Union and the United States 
as between socialist and capitalist states, even if best international relations exist, 
axiomatic ideological war will be held… Between the USSR and the U.S. just like 
between socialism and capitalism, there is an unavoidable rivalry in many fields—in 
economy, science and technology etc.”17
In order to understand the perception and interpretations of American foreign 
policy by the communist regime in Poland, it needs to be emphasized that the re-
gime used specific vocabulary. The notion of the external enemy played a pivotal 
role in “communist slang,” which was an indispensable element of the communist 
perception of the world. Mariusz Mazur enumerates the imperialism, the Western 
German threat, Zionism, the hostile Western mass media (Radio Free Europe, Voice 
of America etc) and the anti–democratic, anti–socialist and anti–peace forces.18 The 
ideological threat of American imperialism was present constantly in communist 
propaganda.19 As Mazur accurately points out, “…the imperialism was often used 
17  Wizyta Nixona w Moskwie i Warszawie, Centralny Ośrodek Dokumentacji Prasowej PAP, Rok 7. (Warszawa: sierpień, 
1972), 61–64.
18  M. Mazur, Propagandowy obraz świata. Polityczne kampanie prasowe w PRL 1956–1980. (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo 
Trio, 2003), 176.
19  Mariusz Mazur writes that the ideological threat of  the American imperialism was present only during the 
strong anti Zionist campaign in Poland in 1968. My research on different speeches of  communist leaders in the 
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together with the notions of revenge–seeking and Zionism.” During the apogee of 
the Cold War, imperialism was the key motive to explain all kinds of failures and 
defeats in the socialist system. 
In the Polish mass media campaigns of the sixties, imperialism occurred sepa-
rately only as an explanation of distant events (i.e. the War in Vietnam). Neverthe-
less, the sole appearance of this concept was supposed to evoke the impression of an 
extremely dangerous situation, threatening the sole existence of statehood and re-
quiring immediate and radical reaction.20 Still though, imperialism was excessively 
vague and abstract for Polish society. Furthermore, it was associated with the Unit-
ed States, which despite the efforts of the propaganda not necessarily had to evoke 
unequivocally negative emotions.21 This statement receives support in the research 
of Piotr Ostaszewski, who in the last decade of the twentieth century examined the 
opinions of two generations of Poles on the Vietnam War.22
According to him, although the Polish communist propaganda tried to create posi-
tive perceptions of the Vietnamese communists, the reverse result was achieved. “…the 
perception of the Vietnamese communists was rather negative and the research data 
show that most of the Polish society was impervious to the model promoted by the offi-
cial communist propaganda... The ultimate conclusion of Ostaszewski is that regardless 
of official communist propaganda Polish society preserved pro-American attitude.23
Another example of the unclear meaning of official propaganda was the de-
piction of the rising German revisionism. On the basis of the concrete unsolved 
question of the Polish western border, the propaganda created the myth of the new 
alliance between Hitlerism and American imperialism. Yet, this was not an achieve-
ment of the Polish communists. It was only an adjusted version of Joseph Stalin’s 
words during the early days of the anti-West campaign in 1946 when he said “Impe-
rialism is the second next to fascism enemy of the progressive humanity…”24 
Though the notion of German revisionism was difficult to define, the commu-
nists didn’t have to look far for delivering examples of that threat. It was enough just 
to quote every speech from the West undermining the shape of the Polish western 
context of  the Vietnam War indicates continuous reach for this argument. See: O pokój i bezpieczeństwo w Europie, 
Dokumenty narady partii komunistycznych i robotniczych Europy w Karlowych Warach, kwiecień 1967. (Warszawa: Książka 
i Wiedza, 1967) or W. Góralski, Aktualne problemy konfliktu wietnamskiego. (“Problemy i Wydarzenia” No. 43, 
Komitet Warszawski PZPR. Wydział Propagandy i Agitacji, czerwiec 1969).
20  M. Mazur, op. cit. 177–178.
21  Ibid.
22  The research focused on two groups. The first one consisted of  people, who were already adults dur-
ing the Vietnam War and the second was consisted of  people in their twenties during the time of  the re-
search. The results are published in: P. Ostaszewski, Amerykańska wojna w Wietnamie 1965–1973, w opinii dwóch 
pokoleń społeczeństwa polskiego, Vol. 5. (Rozprawy i Materiały Ośrodka Studiów Amerykańskich Uniwersytetu 
Warszawskiego, Warszawa: 1999).
23  Ibid. 29.
24  W. Roszkowski, op. cit. 32.
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border. Also the meaning of the word “West” was not unambiguous. This vast term 
often meant contradictory things. Sometimes it meant the whole “West” in terms 
of Western Europe and the United States or NATO, but other times it meant only 
the United States. This was made with the hope that the countries around the world 
and from Western Europe not supporting American policies would take the chance 
to distinguish themselves and join the “progressive world.”25
The language used by communist propaganda was specific in terms of meaning 
and in terms of usage. Once it could describe a particular example, case or story, an-
other time it could reflect an unclear, vague and difficult to locate threat. Although 
dubious, it became the most efficient tool in the process of the creation of an atmo-
sphere of constant threat and emergency.
The priorities of  Polish foreign policy
The emergence of the Cold War left Warsaw and Washington on both sides of 
the iron curtain. Since the announcement of the policy of containment, the main 
priority for the United States was active involvement around the globe in order to 
prevent the spread of communism. Thus, the bilateral relations between Poland and 
United States became derivative of the main stream tensions between Moscow and 
Washington. As Anna Mazurkiewicz mentioned “…undoubtedly, between 1947 
and 1989 the relations between Warsaw and Washington in general perspective re-
mained a function of the American–Soviet relations…”26 
Polish foreign policy had its specifics during the Cold War. Although complete-
ly dependent on the priorities set up in Moscow, Warsaw’s foreign policy was in ac-
cordance with “the spirit of the time”. The main aim, according to L. Pastusiak was 
“…to fight in order to prevent the eruption of a new war…” The rest of the priorities 
concerned the recognition of the Polish western border as definitive; prevention 
of the rebuilding of the German revisionism, the remilitarization of Germany and 
settlement of the German issue in accordance with the interests of the European 
25  The final declaration of  the meeting of  the communist and working parties in Europe at Karlovy Vary 
(Czechoslowakia) in 1967 it was declar ed: The European allies of  the United States no longer accept the 
contradictory to their national interests and national dignity, role of  a satellite to the American imperialist gen-
darme, which attempts to stop the course of  history and tries to stifle the independence movements around 
the world. The American allies see clearly that the American policy does not take into account their national in-
terests. That Washington by making dangerous decisions about aggressions and interventions puts them at fait 
accompli. This creates the threat of  drawing them to rows in the name of  alien interests. O pokój i bezpieczeństwo 
w Europie, Dokumenty narady partii komunistycznych i robotniczych Europy w Karlowych Warach, kwiecień 1967. (War-
szawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1967), 12–13.
26  A. Mazurkiewicz, Dyplomacja Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec wyborów w Polsce w latach 1947 i 1989. (Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Neriton, 2007), 282. Also L. Pastusiak, op. cit. 13.
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security; prevention of the deterioration of the relations with western countries; 
protection of Polish economic interests in its relations with the West; and, last but 
not least, protection of the citizens of Polish descent in the West who became vic-
tims of political repressions.27 
The priorities enumerated by Pastusiak reveal not only the stated issues of con-
cern but also the ideological background. The American perception of Polish pri-
orities was reduced to collaboration with the Soviet bloc, maintenance of present 
borders (i.e. along the Oder Neisse rivers in the West), and weakening the influence 
of the United States and its allies.28 
The developments of the fifties brought the Soviet bloc to the conviction that 
the evil West would not be defeated easily. Therefore, the priorities were slightly 
modified. Richard Staar quotes Adam Rapacki’s article from 1960 “Three principles 
of Foreign Policy” where the proletarian internationalism and unity in relations 
with countries of the Socialist camp has been reconfirmed. 
Simultaneously, bearing in mind the process of decolonization Poland declared 
“solidarity with liberation and emancipation movements of nations striving to free 
themselves from colonial dependence…” This “friendly” position was directly linked 
with the fact that the process of decolonization meant decrease of the western con-
trol over vast territories in the Third world. 
Finally, Rapacki underlined the “constructive struggle for peaceful coexistence 
in relations with all countries having different system…”29 Leaving aside the logical 
contradiction in this sentence, it depicts the tendency to accept the achieved status 
quo in international relations and to search out possibilities for cooperation, where 
available, with the West.
The idea of cooperation had two elements: real and propaganda. The real intention 
was to obtain financial support for the inefficient and often utopian efforts to continue 
the idea of a planned economy. Whereas the propaganda element was to underline the 
good will and open spirit of the Communist regimes in comparison to the negative and 
hostile approach of the West, the communist regime in Poland quickly learned how to 
make use of its official propaganda from all the contacts with the United States.
The peaceful communist propaganda was not altruistic. Behind the slogans of 
peace, friendship, help, brotherhood and solidarity, practical goals were expected to 
be achieved. Władysław Gomulka’s words from 1960 reveal that 
The strategic goal of peaceful coexistence is the victory of socialism over 
capitalism on a world scale. Socialism can defeat capitalism without the 
27  Ibid.
28  R.F. Staar, Poland 1944–1962: The Sovietization of  a Captive People. (Louisiana State University Press, 1962), 107.
29  Ibid. 108.
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catastrophe of a world war. Ten to fifteen years of peace will be sufficient 
for socialist states to overtake the highly industrialized and economically 
developed capitalist states…30
Thus, the communists reached the conclusion that open war is not a possible 
solution of the ideological confrontation, whereas peaceful coexistence will eventu-
ally lead also to victory over capitalism. 
After another decade the voice of the official Polish propaganda was even milder. 
During President Richard Nixon’s visit to Warsaw in 1972 Polish official publica-
tions interpreted the visit as the most convincing proof for the acceptance of the 
status quo by the West.31 
The 1960s brought about a visible improvement in Polish–American relations based 
on the principle of coexistence of states with different socio-economic systems.32 The 
idea of the final victory of the communism was replaced by the notion that even official 
recognition of the status quo (the Polish western border and the communism in Po-
land) was sufficient achievement of communism. From the official statements one can 
easily get the impression that the Cold War was over. “But as the international tension 
decreased and the Cold War died down, the cooperation gradually began to be extend-
ed…”33 Also, the words of the Polish Ambassador in Washington, published in the same 
brochure were in the same style: “President Nixon’s visit to Poland was a demonstration 
of the practical implementation of the principle of peaceful coexistence between states 
with different socio-political systems, which is the basis of Polish foreign policy…”34 
However, the priorities remained the same and they were constantly repeated by the of-
ficial propaganda with the hope that this would make the status quo stronger.
The postwar period has given Poland a new image. Poland is now a state 
with fixed and inviolable frontiers and an ethnically homogeneous popu-
lation—a state with an active foreign policy whose voice is reckoned with 
in the international arena.35
During Nixon’s visit in Warsaw a number of bilateral agreements concerning 
economic, scientific and cultural cooperation were signed. The establishment of 
new Consulates in Krakow and New York was agreed upon and a direct airline 
30  Gomulka was the First Secretary of  the Polish Workers Party 1943–1948 and of  the Polish United Workers 
Party 1956–1970. Władysław Gomulka’s speech at Katowice on July 6, 1960 in: R.F. Staar, op. cit. 65.
31  President Nixon’s 24 hours in Warsaw. (Warsaw: Interpress Publishers, 1972), 16.
32  Ibid.
33  Ibid.
34  Ibid. 21–22.
35  Ibid. 17.
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was opened from Warsaw to New York. The improvement of the bilateral relations 
between the U.S. and Poland was possible due to the general improvement in the 
atmosphere between the East and the West. The intensification of the contacts be-
tween Warsaw and Washington led to the visit of Edward Gierek to the United 
States in October 1974. Prior to the visit the official newspaper of the Polish United 
Workers Party People’s Tribune (Trybuna Ludu) emphasized that 
This visit is a part of the larger process of relaxation, which became domi-
nant tendency of the contemporary world. This process was initialized 
by the Soviet Union, Poland and other countries from the socialist com-
monwealth. It is simultaneously integral part and result of the policy 
of peaceful coexistence. In this policy the Soviet Union plays a leading 
role.…Over the ocean the leader of our party will represent socialist Po-
land, bound by inseparable alliance with the Soviet Union, important cell 
of the socialist commonwealth, state with dynamic economic growth, ac-
tive and respected on the international arena.36
The constant confirmation of the close relations with the Soviet Union was 
needed not only in order to emphasize the strength of the Eastern bloc but also 
to preventively calm down Moscow. In that respect Edward Gierek’s interview for 
Time Magazine delivered irrefutable arguments. First of all “…the only country that 
helped us [Poland–S.D.] after WWII was the Soviet Union…” However, in the con-
text of the CSCE conference and the East–West relations, the Polish leader em-
phasized that “…we are not afraid of anything that will come from the West with the 
exception of some moral phenomenon like drug addiction etc…”37
The Polish priorities in bilateral relations seemed unchanged. Poland was pres-
suring for closer economic cooperation. Under the cover of the American fascina-
tion with Polish achievements, Gierek hoped to receive strong financial support.38 
The propaganda emphasized that Poland was the second biggest economic part-
ner to the U.S. after the Soviet Union from the Eastern bloc and the only country 
from the bloc to obtain the most preferable nation clause in trade with the U.S. The 
36  Gierek’s visit to US, Centralny ośrodek dokumentacji prasowej przy PAP, Rok 14. (Warszawa: 1974), 7/100, 15.
37  Ibid. 19–23.
38  In this respect the Polish Information Agency (PAP) quoted the NBC program „Today”: “…In times when 
we are facing difficulties caused by the inflation, Poland under E. Gierek’s rule experiences unusual develop-
ment. E. Gierek was depicted as “the architect of  Poland’s recent development.” GDP in Poland rises 11% per 
year” …the striking modernity of  Warsaw, which was almost totally demolished during WWII. Well dressed 
Poles, compliments about the Polish girls. Pictures of  growing industry (shipyards), motor industry and the 
willingness to posses own car by most of  the Poles, youth disco clubs. Mentioning about the policy of  raising 
salaries and simultaneously keeping the prices low. It is a fascinating country! Vast possibilities for the Poles 
to travel abroad! Underlying the democratic character of  Poland by constant mentioning about the fact that 
Gierek is supported by the almost full majority of  Poles and the close relations with Moscow…” Gierek’s visit 
to U.S..., 7.
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Polish delegation constantly underlined the predictions that trade turnover would 
reach two billion dollars until 1980.39
Yet, the improvement of bilateral relations did not mean any concessions in the 
sphere of the ideological clash. Poland was a staunch ally of the Soviet Union and 
Gierek did not skip the occasion to make it clear during his speech at the United 
Nations General Assembly. While ascribing to the socialist countries the success for 
the CSCE conference, Gierek repeated the principle of peaceful coexistence among 
countries with different political systems. The aim of that principle was “making the 
détente irreversible in order to defeat the imposed by the imperialist forces political 
and military confrontation, which is the main reason for the arms race, tensions and 
threats to the international peace…”40 Simultaneously, Poland continued the policy 
of open criticism toward U.S. actions in Vietnam, Palestine, Cyprus and Chile in 
accordance with the Soviet position.
Poland’s Propaganda and the Vietnam War
The Vietnam War was another possibility to accent the unity of the socialist 
world and the decisive stand in international affairs. In Poland, as in other socialist 
countries, the war was depicted as
…part of their [United States–S.D.] struggle to continue their influences 
in South East Asia and on the whole Far East. It is also an important ele-
ment of the resistance against the national-liberating movements fighting 
against the neocolonial forms of imperialist ruling in Asia and other parts 
of the world.”41
 Additionally, the war attempted to destroy the socialist achievements of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) or also was a holy war against the Ameri-
can imperialism.42
Such a picture of the War delivered justification for the direct involvement of 
the Eastern bloc. It would be impossible to quote all the documents and statements 
of Moscow and its satellites on that matter, but some examples clearly unveil the 
intentions. 
39  Gierek’s visit to U.S..., 37.
40  Ibid. 46–49.
41  W. Góralski, op. cit. 4.
42  B. Kołodziejczak, E. Wójcik, Wojna USA w Wietnamie. (Warszawa: 1979), 55. This is exerpt from the Ho Chi 
Minh statement in ibid. 61.
cold war.indb   36 2010-02-02   14:36:57
36
◀ Spasimir Domaradzki ▶
37
◀ The Polish Perspective of American Foreign Policy: Selected Moments from the Cold War Era ▶
In the declaration of the Warsaw Pact from July 6, 1966 condemning the ongo-
ing bombardment and other acts of aggression by the U.S. in Vietnam we read: 
…to provide and will continue to provide DRV constantly growing mor-
al-political support and various help, i.e. material and defense related 
means, materials, technical and specialists indispensable for the victori-
ous repulse of the American aggression, taking into consideration the 
needs stemming from the new phase of the War in Vietnam.43
The final declaration of the 1967 European meeting of the European commu-
nist parties in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia included an Appeal of support for the 
Vietnamese nation.44 A year later during their meeting in Budapest, representatives 
of sixty seven communist parties declared among others: 
We, the communists, consider the solidarity with the fighting Vietnam 
for our most viable internationalist responsibility. On behalf of our par-
ties, on behalf of millions of our supporters, once again we firmly de-
clare our will to give our indispensable support to the Vietnamese nation, 
which stands on the frontline of the armed fight with the imperialism.45 
The American atrocities in Vietnam became a constant element in communist 
propaganda. The publications on that subject in Poland from the late sixties and 
early seventies as one mention the fact that United States dropped over four times 
more bombs than during the air raids over Germany during World War II.46
American actions were described as “…village pacification and penal expeditions 
on daily basis and use of guns against demonstrators.”47 The existence of concentra-
tion camps, thousands of prisons and the commission of such acts as rapes, deliber-
ate murders and were inseparable elements of every analysis. The South Vietnamese 
leaders were protégés to Washington and were presented as cruel and vicious.
43  W. Góralski, op. cit. 27.
44  The text of  the final declaration of  the 1967 European meeting of  the European communist parties in Kar-
lovy Vary is available in English at http://www.ena.lu/ (accessed March 14, 2009) The text of  the appeal was 
published in the Polish version of  that document. O pokój i bezpieczeństwo w Europie, Dokumenty narady partii komu-
nistycznych i robotniczych Europy w Karlowych Warach, kwiecień 1967. (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1967), 35–37.
45  W. Góralski, op. cit. 28.
46  Ibid. 56, as well as S. Wilkosz, Wietnam–anatomia zwycięstwa i klęski. (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1977), 309.
47  W. Góralski, op. cit. 5–8.
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Leaders of the hunta in Southern Vietnam from the early 60s—Nguyen 
Cao Ky whose best hero is Hitler and slightly more moderate Nguyen 
Van Thieu were perpetrators of … political repressions against not 
only communists, but every progressive person and even against the 
“neutralists.”48 
In the aftermath of the Paris accords defeat of the United States was an-
nounced. 
“In the Vietnam war winning were not only the interests of the Vietnamese 
nation and its heroism, but triumphant were also the basic rules of political logic, 
strategy and justice. Those who stubbornly broke these rules—had to loose…” and 
further…” The [American–S.D.] mistakes grew from the strong imperialistic am-
bitions, neocolonialist intentions and the doctrines of the police kind of style of 
subordinating the world.”49
This defeat had far-reaching consequences which the Communist propaganda 
could not miss to emphasize. Stanisław Wilkosz delivered a brilliant example.
By signing the Paris accord USA recognized their defeat in Vietnam and 
understood the mistakes that have been made. However, there were also 
other reasons for signing the treaty. During these 8 years when the war 
lasted the political situation around the world has changed radically. 
There is a new arrangement in the relations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, in Asia a new situation has been established, the 
position of the Third world countries has been strengthened and the 
American doctrines ceased to be in force. Neither help nor the size of 
American investments decided anymore about the policies of the young 
Asian and African countries. The ice age of the Cold War was over. Unit-
ed States had to adjust its global policy concepts with the new propor-
tions of power, they had to agree to thaw, to relaxation, to détente.50
In other words, it was the United States that faced total defeat. This defeat was 
possible because of the continuous efforts for peace of the Eastern bloc. The de-
feat also forced the United States to accept the new reality. Whatever happened for 
good was achieved by the Eastern bloc. Remarkably, although prepared only two 
years after the Helsinki accords, the need for financial support and credits from the 
West were passed over in this analysis.
48  Ibid. 38.
49  S. Wilkosz, op. cit. 311; 231–232.
50  Ibid. 307.
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Conclusion
Although highly selective and incomplete, this paper aimed at emphasizing 
some important and lesser known elements of Polish–American relations which 
must be taken into consideration in the process of evaluating the developments dur-
ing the Cold War.
Poland became part of the Soviet bloc as a consequence of mainstream interna-
tional politics and in defiance with its own willingness. From the moment when the 
communists obtained absolute control over the country, Warsaw became a faithful 
ally of the Soviet Union who constantly supported and executed the dispositions 
from Moscow. This paper does not analyze the role of Polish society, its attitude to-
ward the communists and the internal developments. There were many examples in 
Polish history during the Cold War (1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980) when the west-
ern world received signals of dissatisfaction and protests against the system. How-
ever, until 1981 this was not an issue seriously considered in Washington. Despite 
the disappointment among the Poles from the fact that they had been left behind 
the iron curtain, the society preserved its pro–American attitude. 
Until the late seventies the Polish government’s perception of American foreign 
policy was based on two pillars. The first one was the ideological struggle in which 
Poland was a constant propagator of socialist principles which led to the inevitable 
clash with Western values. The second one was the need for financial support which 
forced the countries from the Soviet bloc to seek cooperation with the West. They 
implemented at the beginning of the sixties a theory of peaceful coexistence which 
was the practical attempt to incorporate these two contradicting pillars.
In conclusion, the Polish perspective of American foreign policy was derivative 
of the East–West mainstream relations. At the same time, it did not take into con-
sideration the opinion and sympathy of Polish society. Therefore, from the end of 
World War II until the establishment of Solidarity, Polish–American relations were 
inconsistent because of ideological differences. 
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Maryna Bessonova
Soviet Perspective on the Cold War  
and American Foreign Policy
Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, when the Soviet Union was dissolved 
and former Soviet republics became sovereign states. Since that time Ukraine start-
ed its own policy, with the Ukrainian point of view on history, international rela-
tions, and politics differing greatly from the Russian perspective. But during the 
Cold War period, Ukraine was also a part of the USSR, which is why we can talk 
about Ukrainian perspective of that time as the Soviet one.
The better way to understand the specific features of the Soviet interpretations 
of the Cold War era is first to describe some basic facts about the Soviet Union. The 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] (official full name of the Soviet Union) 
came into being in 1922 after a long period of the civil war, which started at 1917. 
Many different political parties and groups were struggling for power in the former 
Russian empire, but soon the only one remained in the political arena: the Bolshe-
viks (later called the Communists). Since 1920s the government and the political 
organization of the country were defined by the single party: the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union.
The Communist’s philosophy of history was one where the history of mankind 
is a process of revolutionary changes based on social-economic formation for the 
next stage of more progressive civilization. According to this philosophy, capitalism 
would be changed into communism. In global politics, this result was a continua-
tion of the class struggle between the regressive capitalists and the progressive work-
ing classes. 
As Communists considered themselves as a vanguard of the revolutionary prole-
tariat, their “aim” was to build socialist society in the whole world. At the beginning 
of 1920s it became clear that it would be impossible to spread the revolutionary 
cold war.indb   41 2010-02-02   14:36:57
42
◀ Maryna Bessonova ▶
43
◀ Soviet Perspective on the Cold War and American Foreign Policy ▶
movement all over the world, especially in those regimes where communists came to 
power1. The idea of world socialist revolution was postponed, but it remain as one 
of the main ideas of Soviet foreign policy. 
Another important note about Soviet policy and politics was connected with 
internal situation in the Soviet Union. Communists came into power in Russia by 
force and their domestic policy in first years failed. One of the ways for the Com-
munists to keep power in their hands was to consolidate society around them by 
“finding an enemy” and to hold them responsible for any defeats.
From Soviet history one can find many attempts to finding “enemies” inside as 
well as outside the regime. Struggle with those enemies was a way to keep society 
“busy”. While struggling with enemies, less attention was paid to the failed reforms. 
For example, in 1917–1920s the main “fight” was with the external and internal 
enemies of the socialist revolution; in 1920–1930s the political struggle with inside 
enemies of the Communist party; and in 1941–1945 fight with fascist Germany 
(World War II). 
The semantics of the Soviet politics from the very beginning was full of such 
words as “fight,” “struggle,” “war,” “antagonism,” “implacable foe,” “camp,” and other 
military terms. The leaders of the country considered the USSR as the first socialist 
state against a blockade of capitalist powers and felt they were in constant danger, 
fearing a new war was possible and expected. The Soviet approaches towards his-
torical descriptions of the twentieth century showed that with the emergence of 
the new type of state – socialist one – it became a target for capitalist aggression. 
According to this perspective, all possible conflicts in international relations with 
the Soviet Union were interpreted as attempts by capitalist powers to suppress the 
young socialist state. That was a reason why throughout the pre-WWII history the 
Soviet Union was a certain outsider of international relations.
Under the Stalin’s rule, Soviet society was extremely consolidated, being in-
volved into the constant struggle with internal and external enemies. Many Soviet 
citizens under different circumstances were repressed with a charge “the enemy of 
the people” and even during the World War II when the external enemy was more 
than clear, new victims for the strengthening of the socialist state were surprisingly 
large in number. With the end of the World War II that kind of “fighting mood” 
did not disappeared; and only after the Stalin’s death in 1953 did some changes 
occurred in Soviet foreign and domestic policy. One of the best examples of such 
1  For example: The Alsace Soviet Republic, November 10–22, 1918 (A short-lived Soviet republic created during 
the German Revolution at the end of  World War I in the province of  Alsace, which had been part of  Germany 
since 1871); The Bavarian (Munich) Soviet Republic, April–May 1919 (The short-lived attempt to establish a socialist 
state in form of  a council republic in the Free State of  Bavaria. It sought independence from the also recently 
proclaimed Weimar Republic); The Hungarian Soviet Republic, March–August 1919 (a Communist regime estab-
lished in Hungary under the leadership of  Béla Kun); The Persian Socialist Soviet Republic, June 1920 – September 
1921 (widely known as the Soviet Republic of  Gilan, a short-lived Soviet republic in the Iranian province of  
Gilan) It was established with the assistance of  the Red Army.
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approaches was so called “Zhdanov’s doctrine” – a conception declared in Septem-
ber 1947 that after the World War II the world was divided into two main camps – 
socialist and capitalist – with each of them with contrary but similar aims of foreign 
policy: to crush the other side. 2 This point of view became dominant not only in the 
politics of the Soviet Union, but in the other socialist countries as well. In his The 
economic problems of the socialism in the USSR (1952), Stalin once more underlined 
that crises and collapse of the world capitalist system is inescapable: wars were ines-
capable which is why the Soviet Union had to annihilate imperialist and capitalist 
countries3.
After Stalin Khrushchev came into power and soften the Soviet approach towards 
different issues, especially towards idea of the world socialist revolution. It was finally 
moved to the background of primary Soviet interests and was replaced by the new 
idea of competition of two different social-political systems: socialism and capital-
ism. That is why fight with world bourgeoisie turned into more constructive emula-
tion. Formerly struggle with capitalism and imperialism was aimed on its complete 
destruction, but since new approach was declared in 1950s Soviet policy was targeted 
on the “fight to be first” and to built new socialist world as proof of the advantages of 
the Soviet system. A great number of examples can be found of such contest in sport, 
culture, science, technologies, medical care, and education and so on. At least within 
the Soviet Union each development was declared as the unique achievement of the 
socialist system. The brightest model of attempts to implement that competition was 
slogan: “overtake and surpass America,” which became very popular in the USSR after 
Khrushchev’s speech in 1957, when he proposed to overtake and surpass America in 
all economic indicators and to build communism until 1980.
The idea of competition between two social-political systems played some kind 
of integration role for the Soviet society: the enemy was defined, and it was clear 
how to achieve victory in all spheres of life in order to show that the socialist way of 
life is better than capitalist one. At the same time the idea of peaceful coexistence 
was reborn, but is was revised as the specific form of class struggle.
During Brezhnev’s era, Khrushchev’s approaches were not changed radically. 
The idea of peaceful coexistence remained as the important one, but Brezhnev 
modified it: the idea of consolidation of all socialist countries and newly indepen-
dent countries-former colonies. This modification was combined with so-called Br-
ezhnev’s doctrine, according to which nobody had a right to interrupt the Eastern 
bloc’s processes of building a socialist community.
Real changes in the Soviet foreign policy occurred only when Gorbachev came 
into power. The main ideas of so called “new political thinking” Gorbachev described 
2  Andrei Zhdanov was Chairman of  the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet July 15, 
1938–June 20, 1947.
3  Міжнародні відносини та зовнішня політика (1945–70-ті роки): Навчальний посібник [The International Relations 
and Foreign Policy (1945–1970s)] Либідь, Київ 2003, 32.
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in his book Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (1988), which 
was translated to many foreign languages and published in many countries. The new 
approach meant first of all the cancellation of the idea of class struggle and was built 
on the concept of universal values of mankind and the mutual peace interests of dif-
ferent nations, cultures, societies and types of states. On that political background 
the idea of peaceful coexistence was once more reborn and the ideas of the world 
socialist revolution and class struggle were finally given up.
We can summarize, that Soviet domestic and foreign policy were defined by 
combination and piecemeal replacement of few main ideas: find and fight the en-
emy, the idea of world socialist revolution, the idea of competition of two social-
political systems, and peaceful coexistence.
Origins of  the Cold War: Who was guilty?
It’s a well known fact that Cold war was a period of enormous confrontation 
between USSR and US. After the World War II these two countries changed their 
status of “great powers” to “superpowers” and a new bipolar system of international 
relations was formed. As the US became the leader of the world bourgeoisie after 
the World War II, it became the main enemy for the Soviet Union in post-war pe-
riod. According to the Soviet interpretations the Cold War was provoked by the 
policy of the US and other imperialistic countries towards socialist states, first of all 
towards the USSR4
Soviet explanations of the background of the Cold War were presented as fol-
lowing:
(1) The Cold War was an attempt of the United States to change the results of the 
World War II. One of the main results for the Soviet Union was the appearance of 
the “socialist camp”: the number of countries with the similar socialist system. It was 
first positive move towards realization of the Soviet foreign policy main idea: the 
world socialist revolution and creation of the socialist society in the whole world. 
So those who wanted to change this result of the World War II wanted to destroy 
the socialist system.
(2) The US had plans to dominate in the entire world. After the World War II the 
US became a leader in the West, which used its chance to present their own interests 
as the interests of the whole capitalist world, while other countries were dealing 
with their economic recovering after the war. That is why American post-war for-
eign policy was interpreted by the Soviets as attempts to build “Pax Americana” and 
4  Дипломатический словарь [Diplomatic Dictionary], Издательство Наука, Москва 1986, Vol. 3, 536.
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that idea was seen as a threat. The Soviet state had its own idea to build a socialist 
world oriented on the benefits of all mankind and especially for the working class all 
over the Earth, while US was oriented only for their own purposes.
(3) All US post-war foreign policy doctrines were aimed on the struggle with social-
ism. After the victory of allies in the World War II a new and more global threat of 
international communism led to the appearance of new approaches in American 
foreign policy. The majority of US foreign policy doctrines emerged during the Cold 
War, and mainly they all were oriented against Soviet Union and its satellites. 
Let’s make a brief review of Soviet interpretations of those doctrines. The Con-
tainment Doctrine (1946) was aimed on justification of the US’s aggressive foreign 
policy, which was provided for active interruption of American imperialism into 
the internal affairs of the socialist countries, the maintenance of reactionary po-
litical regimes in all part of the world, and the weakening of the USSR by military, 
political and economic pressure.5 The Containment strategy was featured in the 
Truman doctrine and Marshall Plan. The Truman Doctrine (1947) was seen as first 
official implementation of strategy of containing communism by active financial in-
volvement into the internal affairs of Greece and Turkey under the reason of “com-
munist threat” and “national security interests of US”. As it was mentioned in Soviet 
publications, the treaty provisions on American assistance in Greece and Turkey led 
to the creation of the springboard for attack on the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries as well as to the US penetration to the Middle East.6 The Marshall Plan 
(1947) was another manifestation of American expansionism in Europe directed on 
active involvement into the economic recovering of European countries and widen-
ing of American presence on the continent. The USSR agreed with economic assis-
tance propositions of the US, but was against American interference in the internal 
affairs of other countries.7 That is why none of socialist countries was allowed to join 
that program. 
The next one was the Liberation Doctrine (1952) created by J. Dulles who meant 
first of all the liberation from the communism because on his opinion “we (US) 
shall never have secure peace or a happy world so long as Soviet communism domi-
nates one-third of all of the peoples that there are, and is in the process of trying at 
least to extend its rule to many others.”8 The main idea was to disintegrate socialist 
5  Современные Соединенные Штаты Америки: Энциклопедический справочник [The Contemporary US; the Encyclopae-
dic Handbook] , Политиздат, Москва 1988, 263.
6  Ibid.
7  B.B. Александров (1988), Новейшая история стран Европы и Америки (1945-1986 гг.) [V.V. Alexandrov, The 
Modern History of  Countries of  Europe and America (1945–1986)], Высшая школа, Москва, 15.
8  J. Dulles, Statement on Liberation Policy, January 15 1953, full text at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/
index.asp?document=1613 (last accessed: 17.07.2009).
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unity which was interpreted as a monolithic structure. Dulles was author of other 
doctrines as well and he was one of the pioneers of massive retaliation and brink-
manship strategy, tactical task of which was with blackmail and threat to get dif-
ferent concessions from the Soviet Union and its satellites.9 The Eisenhower-Dulles 
Doctrine (1957) showed further open interference of the US into the Middle East 
region while other capitalist countries were loosing their position there. The US 
Congress decision to let American president deal with military help almost inde-
pendently alerted Soviet Union because the main reason of giving military help was 
to struggle with the aggression of those countries, which were controlled by the 
world communism.10 
Kennedy’s “Flexible Response” Strategy (1961) was considered as the next anti-
communist method to use war as the tool to achieve American foreign policy tasks 
aimed on local wars as the suppression of world revolutionary and national-libera-
tion movement.11 But after the Cuban missile crisis a new emphasis became mani-
fest in American foreign policy: more attention was paid to economical, political 
and ideological actions focused on improvement of the capitalism in developing 
countries and thereby creating a positive image of the US. One of the new features 
of that policy was creation of the Peace Corps (1961) which activity was used by 
CIA and was directed on the strengthening of American ideological, political and 
economic penetration into the developing countries. At the same time usage of so 
called “quiet counterrevolution” methods became more often to prevent escalation 
of local conflict into the global one. That is why at that time in the Soviet Union 
Kennedy’s policy was evaluated as inconsistent and contradictory because it com-
bined aggravation with the USSR and some realistic steps towards diminishing of 
international tension, such as the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the at-
mosphere, in outer space and under water signed by Soviet Union, US and Great 
Britain (1963).12 
The Mann (1964) and Johnson (1965) Doctrines contained ideas about support 
of authoritarian regimes in Latin America, further economic and political isolation 
of Cuba and organization of collective actions against communist threats. Both 
doctrines were ideological “cover” for military intervention of the United States 
into the interior of that region.13 The Johnson Pacific Doctrine (1966) as it was called 
in the Soviet Union reserved for the US national interests not only Western hemi-
9  Современные Соединенные Штаты Америки: Энциклопедический справочник [The Contemporary US; the Encyclopae-
dic Handbook], Политиздат, Москва 1988, 264.
10  История дипломатии [The History of  Diplomacy], Т. 5, Москва 1979, 562–569.
11  Современные Соединенные Штаты Америки: Энциклопедический справочник [The Contemporary US; the Encyclo-
paedic Handbook] , Политиздат, Москва 1988, 266.
12  Советский Союз в борьбе за разоружение: Сборник документов. [Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament: Collection 
of  Documents] Москва 1977, 31–34.
13  Дипломатический словарь [Diplomatic Dictionary], Издательство Наука, Москва 1986, Vol. 1, 306.
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sphere, but South-East Asia, where Vietnam became the most significant example. 
Soviet interpretations of the Nixon Doctrine (1969) underlined that it had attached 
American right to support their allies and friends (the capitalist-oriented states), 
but with the division of tasks: “America cannot – and will not – conceive all the 
plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions, and undertake all the de-
fense of the free nations of the world…”14 In 1970 that point of view was repeated 
– and extended from Asia to the other regions of the world.15 That meant that the 
US policy in Vietnam failed and American government simply wanted to find exit 
from that situation by sharing “obligations” with allied states.
The Ford Doctrine (1975) was some kind of variation of the Nixon strategy of 
lessening of American responsibility and military presence in Asia and other re-
gions. New feature of the Ford Doctrine was proclaimed task to consolidate on new 
“boundaries” (that meant defensive position to which US were forced to retreat in 
the Vietnam War) for the following attack on socialist countries and progressive 
forces of the Asia region.16
The next idea in American foreign policy was Carter’s idea to unite capitalist 
highly developed countries of Western Europe, Japan and United States to resist 
world socialism, the Soviet Union, and national-liberation movements. According 
to Soviet interpretations, the Trilateral perspective (1977) was announced because 
of attempts to overcome crisis in capitalist economy and to strengthen international 
positions of imperialism.17 The Carter Doctrine (1980) declaring the willingness of 
the United States to use military force to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf 
was interpreted more widely and was evaluated in the Soviet Union as renewal of 
expansionism and aggressiveness of American foreign policy. At the period of last 
escalation of the Cold War the Reagan Doctrine (1985) was announced. Its main 
idea was to enlarge American military potential to be able to resist Soviet influence 
in the world with such tools as arms race and economic war against USSR.
We can summarize – that on Soviet point of view all American presidents of 
Cold War period were creating their own doctrines, and all of them were anti-com-
munist and anti-Soviet, even if they were dealing with such regions as Middle East, 
South-East Asia or Latin America.
(4) Western countries (with US) were first who started the Cold War confrontation. 
Winston Churchill’s speech in Fulton March 5, 1946 was interpreted by the Soviet 
14  E.R. Wittkopf, Ch.W. Kegley Jr., J.M. Scott (2003), American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process, Thomson Wads- 
worth, 51.
15  Современные Соединенные Штаты Америки: Энциклопедический справочник [The Contemporary US; the Encyclo-
paedic Handbook], Политиздат, Москва 1988, 268.
16  Дипломатический словарь [Diplomatic Dictionary], Издательство Наука, Москва 1986, Vol. 3, 517.
17  B.B. Александров (1988), Новейшая история стран Европы и Америки (1945–1986 гг.) [V.V. Alexandrov, The 
Modern History of  Countries of  Europe and America (1945–1986)], Высшая школа, Москва, 207.
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Union as the character assassination to the address of the USSR. That speech de-
clared a crusade against socialism and pronounced the program of British-American 
world domination not only after the World War II, but for further centuries18.
According to Soviet concept first vivid steps, which signalized about the start of 
the confrontation between East and West, were steps made by the West. In all Soviet 
historical textbooks (they usually presented official interpretation of history) the 
first event of the Cold War was Winston Churchill’s speech in Fulton. 
An interesting fact is that in Western interpretations, the Soviets were perceived 
as the aggressors, with the main role played by Stalin’s speech February 9, 1946; but 
that speech had its own pre-history. A few days before, February 2, 1946, according 
to one of the Communist party documents, cooperation with allies in the World 
War II was determined as the main feature of post-war order. But the next day, 
February 3, 1946, the United States started, propaganda campaign started, aimed 
against Soviet nuclear espionage. That is why it could be considered that Stalin’s 
speech was mostly caused by American mass media campaign against Soviet Union, 
and was not planned as program speech against capitalism. Its rhetoric contained 
nothing especially new, but for the West it seemed a direct signal for confrontation. 
The main theses of Stalin’s speech contained following: (1) Inner conflicts within 
capitalist world would led to new wars; (2) New wars would led to the weakening 
of the capitalist system; (3) New wars would speed up crush of capitalist system be-
cause of socialist revolutions; (4) Soviet social system is more viable; (5) the Soviet 
system is better than other systems19. This speech was considered on the West as 
claiming war against capitalist countries.
If well try to summarize the Soviet point of view on the origin of the Cold War 
– the main idea can be named as following: bipolar confrontation had western roots 
and the Cold War was the policy of the US and other imperialistic countries against 
socialist countries.
What was a role of the USSR? According to its own interpretations, the Soviet 
Union was the only power in the world able to stop American ambitions of super-
power. The area of the Soviet Union occupied 22,402,200 sq. km (while US occu-
pied 9,826,630 sq. km); different natural resources were available; a population 170 
million, more than in US at that time (about 140 million); and even after World 
War II part of Soviet industry remained so economic potential was present. The 
Soviet Union considered itself as the only defender of the interests of the working 
class all over the world because it was the first socialist state in history.
18  История внешней политики СССР 1917–1985 [The History of  the Soviet Foreign policy, 1917–1985] Издательство 
Наука, Москва 1986, Vol. 2, 120.
19  Міжнародні відносини та зовнішня політика (1945–70-ті роки): Навчальний посібник [The International Relations 
and Foreign Policy (1945–1970s)] Либідь, Київ 2003, 30.
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Two lines in the World Politics since World War II
According to Soviet interpretations, one of the main results of the World War 
II was the formation of the two new “lines” in the world politics: the “line of peace” 
presented by Soviet Union, and the “line of war” presented by US.20 This is why 
events in the international relations were interpreted by two ways: (1) all Soviet 
foreign policy acts were seen as peaceful even if they were military interventions; (2) 
American foreign policy was interpreted as aggressive and militaristic. 
That kind of division became vivid just after the end of the World War II. Af-
ter Churchill’s speech, it was clear that capitalist world started preparations to the 
next world war. This idea is in the analytical report of Soviet ambassador in the US, 
N. Novikov’s “American Foreign policy in the post-war period” (1946). The Soviet 
ambassador prepared that report on the demand of Soviet minister of international 
relations, V. Molotov, and it was presented to the members of Soviet delegation on 
the Paris peace conference 27 September 1946. According to Novikov’s observa-
tions, post-war US foreign policy was aimed on achieving of world dominance and 
the maintenance of military potential signaled American preparations for a future 
war that was designed against the Soviet Union21.
The American’s policy was in contrast to the Soviet Union’s peaceful initiatives, 
e.g., the peaceful coexistence of countries with different political systems (socialist 
and capitalist); the continuance of cooperation between the winners of the World 
War II; the strengthening of UN as the organization where all participants are 
equal; the withdrawal of troops from the territory of UN states; general arms cut; 
and the elimination of nuclear weapons. It was underlined in the Soviet mass media 
and then repeated in historical and political science interpretations that they “were 
out of plans” of United States and other capitalist countries.22
According to communist point of view the Cold War was the time when two 
different system of international relation emerged: Democratic and Imperialistic. 
The Democratic was the system of socialist countries, which had very close eco-
nomic, cultural, political ties with the USSR as the leader. Within this system all 
nations tried to help each other in all spheres of life and developments with no com-
petition: only fruitful cooperation existed. The Imperialistic was the system of capi-
talist countries: they had a lot of contradictions in their “camp” where each wanted 
to solve their problems and to defend their own interests by using the others. This 
20  All definitions are used as they were used in Soviet time.
21  В.Л. Мальков, Первые письма с «холодной войны»: «Длинная телеграмма» Кеннана и аналитический обзор Новикова 
«Внешняя политика США в послевоенный период». // Международная жизнь 1990. №11. С. 154. [V. Mal’kov, First 
Letters from the Cold War: Kennan’s “Long Telegram” and Analytical Report of  Novilov “American Foreign Policy in the Post-war 
Period”, “International Life” 1990, Vol. 11, 154.].
22  История внешней политики СССР 1917–1985 [The History of  the Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1985] Издательство 
Наука, Москва 1986, Vol. 2, 123.
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bipolar world was also presented in American textbooks, where post-war world was 
described as divided into two blocks – Democratic in the West and Communist 
in the East. It is vivid with each side confronting the other and taking for itself the 
name “Democratic,”, while the other side was titled by “abusive” one (Imperialists/
Communists).23
The entire world was separated into two main categories: friends and enemies. 
Such black and white world-view was a distinctive feature of Stalin’s way of seeing the 
world (outside as well as inside the USSR), but even after his death, this remained as 
one of the characteristic approach towards international relations. Among friends 
of the USSR you can find such categories as: (1) brother nations in the Eastern 
Europe; (2) nations in the third world countries; (3) working class in the capitalist 
countries. The enemy was the imperialistic circles in the capitalist states.
The explanation of international relations was very simple according to such 
approach: everything that was undertaken by the representatives of the own bloc/
camp was aimed on positive developments of the mankind, on the defence of all-
human values, on the support of national-liberation movements and democracy 
and achieving of main goal with the opposite side trying to build military tools and 
interference into the domestic affairs of other countries. Such ideas were supported 
by all possible means of Soviet propaganda. 
From the secondary school education level to universities, the Soviet people were 
informed about main events of domestic and international affairs, especially about 
American imperialism, counterrevolutionary forces, world capitalism and their ag-
gressive plans to destroy socialist system and not to let newly liberated countries 
(former colonies) to join brotherhood of socialist states. In the secondary schools, 
the historical part of educational program and the number of special so called hu-
manitarian and social science disciplines, as well as in the activities of Pioneer and 
Komsomol organisations, such approaches were originally “put into the minds” of 
Soviet people. 24 Anti-American propaganda continued at university level within 
obligatory program in the courses of “The History of the CPSU,” Marxism-Lenin-
ism, Historical materialism, Dialectical materialism, Political economy, etc. 25 A lot 
of different propaganda posters were produced and centrally spread at schools, uni-
versities, jobsites, public places. For example poster “Two worlds – two plans: We 
(the USSR) are spreading new life. They (the US) are sowing death”, on which two 
different ways of life and main tasks of the society were depicted. The Soviet was 
peaceful planning to raise crops, while American had fatal plans to build new mili-
tary bases. Even in American studies and scientific research in that field everything 
23  For example: W.O. Kellog, American History: the Easy Way, Barron’s Educational series, 1995.
24  The type of  organizations for children and youth operated by a Communist party in the USSR and other 
socialist countries. See for example: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pioneer_movement.
25  CPSU – the Communist Party of  the Soviet Union.
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was subordinated to such aims as to criticize negative aspects of bourgeois society 
in US and American imperialistic foreign policy and to give positive evaluation of 
all types of struggle for rights and liberation: woman’s, working class, ethnic groups 
(Afro-Americans, Indian-Americans). 
A great number of researches are already made all over the world in the field of 
Soviet-American relations. Current investigations give us an opportunity to revise 
events of the Cold War according to new facts and documents. In that case commu-
nist point of view which was presented in the Soviet studies is very interesting be-
cause it shows us huge role of propaganda. Among specific ideas of the Soviet view-
ing of the American policy towards the USSR we can mark out next main ideas: 
(1) The whole American post-war policy was aimed on blocking Soviet peaceful 
initiatives; (2) The United States initiated and forced the arms race; (3) The US 
de-facto blocked the normal activity of UN; (4) All aggravation of the international 
situation were caused by the US policy. Of course Soviet policy was viewed as the 
opposite. And such approaches were showed not only in the sphere of international 
relations but in the domestic policy within the Soviet Union. Propaganda, brain-
wash and agitation within the Soviet society made it possible that even in the cases 
when USSR were demonstrating aggressive and tough policy it was justified as nec-
essary and indispensable in the conditions of struggle for the better world.
The situation in Afghanistan in the late 1970s can be presented as good exam-
ple. The only accessible version of events in that country contains a story about the 
victory in April 1978 of the national-democratic revolution and the formation of 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The USSR was the first country which recog-
nized the new state, and Soviets were the first who proposed all kind of support and 
assistance for young democratic society. An agreement between two countries was 
signed in December 1978 based on friendship, good neighbourly relations, and co-
operation. But new democratic system “was met with unconcealed hostility in the 
US, and in such neighbours as Pakistan and China.”26 Those countries organized 
subversive activities and that led to destabilization of situation. In September and 
December 1979 coups d’etat took place and Afghan government asked the Soviet 
Union for military help. If pro-Soviet government would fail, this would be a big 
blow for the Soviet foreign policy. That is why in December 1979 the Soviet gov-
ernment, according to the 1978 Agreement between Afghanistan and USSR and 
to UN Charter, decided to send Soviet troops (it was warily called limited military 
contingent just to stress that it was small troops and not a big army, although be-
tween 25 December 1979 and 15 February 1989, a total of 620,000 soldiers served 
with the forces in Afghanistan). The conflict involved different countries – the US, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, PRC and others, contributed to Mos-
26  История внешней политики СССР 1917–1985 [The History of  the Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1985] Издательство 
Наука, Москва 1986, Vol. 2, 495.
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cow’s high military costs and strained international relations. But for the Soviet sol-
diers this conflict was presented as the international duty, and their participation 
was propagandized as help to the brother people of Afghanistan, who only started 
building of socialist society. 
The Cuban missile crises can be presented as another good example. For the 
Soviet Union the Cuban revolution was a great achievement because it was a first 
socialist state in Western hemisphere and that fact was certain prove of vitality of 
the world socialist revolution idea. That is why American policy towards Cuba, es-
pecially economic blockade, diversions, military provocations (such as April 1961 
the Bay of Pigs Invasion) were considered as aggressive policy towards new socialist 
state. When in February 1962, US claim Cuba was excluded from Organization 
of American States gave an opportunity for the USSR to show its support towards 
Cuba. On February 19, 1962 the USSR declared its first statement as a support-
ive one towards Cuba and denouncing towards US. In the summer of 1962, Cuba 
asked USSR for military help to prevent American invasion. We can say that Cuban 
crises as geopolitical situation was in some point built in the frame of next items: 
a young socialist state in the blockade of capitalist countries asked for the help the 
only defender of peace and democracy - the Soviet Union. That is why Soviet Union 
position was within main ideas of Soviet foreign policy described earlier. It was sim-
ply help and assistance to the brother nation, but not aggression or own initiative.
American policy towards Eastern Europe
East European countries occupied a unique place in the bipolar system of inter-
national relations. American policy towards that region was completely determined 
by US-USSR relations. It was one of the arenas of real struggle between superpow-
ers. For the Soviet Union it was very important to keep new democratic countries 
(as Eastern European states were called after the post-war elections) within the so-
cialist camp as the proof of successful Soviet policy, as an example of correct way 
of building society under the socialist ideas, and to show how to spread of socialist 
system in the world. For the US, Eastern Europe was important for the opposite 
meaning: it was proof of the wrong way of the Soviet policy as well as of socialist 
type of society and state.
Now the approaches towards interpretations of the US policy towards commu-
nist countries in the Soviet sphere of influence changed. But it would be interesting 
to figure out main features of them. First of all we have to underline that in the So-
viet political science and historical studies a number of American special doctrines 
and tools towards Eastern Europe were determined. Let’s make a short outlook of 
them in chronological appearance.
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Just after the occupation of Germany and the end of the World War II it became 
clear that future development of Europe would be in between few main partici-
pants: the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain. But as it happened 
Great Britain did not manage to keep the position of the superpower, and only two 
main actors were left. The division of Europe became visible on the example of Ber-
lin: when the de facto eastern and western parts of that city symbolized the division 
of the whole Europe. Soviet control of Eastern Berlin as well as of East Germany 
and other Eastern European countries showed that possible future of the whole re-
gion. In the second half of 1940s the main task for the United States was to prevent 
the complete transition of those countries to the “socialist camp.”
American policy at that time was directed on three main issues: support of non-
communists leaders; counteraction/resistance for “sovietization” of the region; 
keeping Eastern European countries as “opened” for the West and American influ-
ence. The Marshall Plan was considered as one of the possible ways to fulfill these 
tasks. The situation in Europe was very crucial because of combination of economic 
problems and political instability. According to the Soviet point of view, the post-
war devastation might lead to the deepening of exploitation of the working people, a 
decline in living standards, and social outburst. Western interpretations describe the 
beauty of Marshall’s plan as it did not appear on the surface to be directed against 
the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State never mentioned the dangers of commu-
nism or the Soviet Union, and he opened the program to all European nations. But 
Soviets saw it as the tool to save capitalist economy and to stop the rise of revo-
lutionary movement towards world socialist revolution. Thus, the participation of 
Eastern Europe in proposed European recovering program was prohibited by Stalin 
and the Western influence in that part of the continent was minimized. 
As soon as coalition governments in East European countries transformed into 
socialist/communist, American policy changed. A new tool of US policy towards 
the whole regions was created: “the economic blockade.” It started in 1949 with the 
adoption of a special law which had not only to control the export but to sanction 
special limits to the trade relations with Eastern European countries. Trade acts with 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary were canceled. Since January 1, 
1949 a Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) start-
ed its activity, and it ceased to function only on March 31, 1994. In 1949 it united 15 
most developed western countries, but soon some other neutral states joined it as well. 
Among them were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. In addition there were a number of cooperating 
countries, such as Austria, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland. 
The main aim of COCOM was to control the export to the socialist countries: an 
extensive list of restricted or prohibited trade items was developed. COCOM had to 
control it to stop the transfer of sensitive technologies to communist states. 
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In October 1951 a new law (it was called the Battle law) was adopted. According 
to it the export had to be limited to those countries that considered being a threat to 
US or its allies. A list of 217 groups of goods was created and similar lists of prohibited 
items Western European countries, Canada and Japan were forced to adopt it as well27. 
Soon Poland and Hungary lost their “most-favorite-nation status.” Some number can 
illustrate the results of that policy: within 1948–1953 American export to Eastern 
Europe decreased in 200 times, East Europe export to US – in 5 times.28
New feature in American policy towards communist countries was the appear-
ance of so called “doubled diplomacy”: a combination of official contacts with com-
munist/socialist governments and non-official/quiet relations with opposition and 
emigration groups. For example in 1949 the US Department of State tried to unite 
all the representatives of East European Diasporas in order to organize their activity 
in Eastern Europe. National Committee of Free Europe and a number of different 
assemblies were created. 
A lot of other examples can be named here to show the broad picture of Ameri-
can policy towards the East European countries. In 1949 a report to the President 
known as NSC 58/2 drafted a document “US policy toward the Soviet Satellite 
states in Eastern Europe” (this document was discussed since May till December 
1949). Eastern Europe was considered to be the “weakest link” within the Soviet 
empire. The main aim of the American foreign policy in that region was declared 
as the abolishing of “soviet power” and adoption of non-communist governments. 
The US even negotiated with France and Britain in May 1950 during the summit 
of Ministers of foreign relations in London and on that meeting an American vari-
ant of the act “Policy towards soviet satellites in Eastern Europe” was adopted. The 
main purpose of that document was to coordinate policy towards socialist countries 
of the East European region. Another well known document NSC 68/2 (Septem-
ber 30, 1950) that proclaimed usage of “secret measures” in economic, political, 
“psychological” war, aimed on rising up and supporting of displeasure in Eastern 
European states. Its practical realization was $100 million which were given in 1951 
for organizing of “army of liberation” (formed of emigrants from the East Europe) 
to act in their countries. Partly these funds had to be used for the support of illegal 
anti-soviet organizations in the region. The main role in the “psychological” war 
was played by radio “Freedom” and “Free Europe” (existed since the 1950s). The 
very clear description of that gave Senator W. Fulbright, who referred to the activity 
of these radio stations as to the essential part of American foreign policy towards 
Eastern Europe and USSR29. 
27 Большая Советская энциклопедия он-лайн [Big Soviet Encyclopaedia] // http://bigsoviet.org/Bse/A-GOGO/0361.
html
28  Современные Соединенные Штаты Америки: Энциклопедический справочник [The Contemporary US; the Encyclo-
paedic Handbook], Политиздат, Москва 1988, 279.
29  С.М. Голяков Специальные каналы радиопропаганды США на службе психологической войны (к истории 
деятельности радиостанций “Свободная Европа” и “Свобода” 1949–1972 гг.): Автореф.дис... кан-та истор. наук. 
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After 1953 the “liberation concept” was proposed by Secretary of State Dulles 
and supported by Eisenhower. According to Soviet interpretation that meant the 
further interference into the events, which took place in Eastern European region. 
But in practice the US did not interfere while in mid 1950s there were a number 
of opportunities to do this: in 1953 there was no reaction from the US to support 
the protests of East Berlin workers against their communist leaders; 1956 attempts 
of Hungarians to overthrown Stalinist-type authorities. The Hungarian events were 
a real possibility for US to show the “liberation” concept in practice: but Eisenhower 
was busy from: (1) the re-election presidential campaign; and (2) the involvement 
into the Suez crisis. The only thing was done was the expression of support on the 
radio “Free Europe”30.
The next decade for American Eastern European policy was in the context of dis-
unity of western alliance. De Gaulle’s France started its own policy towards Eastern 
Europe to “build bridges” to the East. De Gaulle sent his foreign affairs minister to 
several East European countries; and de Gaulle even made official visits to the Soviet 
Union (June 1966), Poland (September 1967), Romania (May 1968). There were 
even planned visits to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. De Gaulle’s aim was to 
break the “hegemonic” hold of both the Soviet Union and the United States and to 
establish a “community of European states” from “Atlantic to the Urals”. In this global 
design, France would be able to reassert its central role in European politics.
Soon the United States showed similar strategy of “building bridges,” which was 
oriented on more flexible methods dealing with East European socialist countries. 
The strategy of “building bridges” was aimed on supporting of local national move-
ments to result in the soft gradual isolation from the Soviet Union. It was considered 
that country, where national movements would win, already started its moving out 
of Soviet dominance and endorsed/joint Western countries. The main tool of this 
concept was the policy of “differentiation.” It was created at Kennedy’s presidency, 
but completely was formed in Johnson’s times. The US policy of differentiation had 
for many years meant “rewarding,” mainly through trade concessions or political 
gestures, Eastern European countries that either distanced themselves from Soviet 
tutelage and embarked on a path of international liberalization. The most revealing 
example in this context was US policy towards Yugoslavia: as USSR-Yugoslav rela-
tions deteriorated, US granted financial assistance to Yugoslavia31.
The 1960s as well as the previous decade had brought a number of crisis for 
USSR in their relations with Eastern European countries, as well as increasing of 
[S. Golyakov, The Special Channels of  the US Radio Propaganda on the Serve of  Psychological War (to the History of  Radio 
Stations Free Europe and Freedom Activity)], Мoscow., 1974, 22.
30  R. Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. N.Y.–Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, 
249.
31  Ю.Б. Качура, Югославия в концепциях и внешней политике США в 60-е гг.: Автореф.дис... кан-та истор. 
наук. [Kachura Yu. Yugoslavia in American Concepts and Foreign Policy in 1960s] Кiev., 1989, 11.
cold war.indb   55 2010-02-02   14:36:58
56
◀ Maryna Bessonova ▶
57
◀ Soviet Perspective on the Cold War and American Foreign Policy ▶
confrontation with the US. There were Berlin crisis and the building a Berlin wall, 
the Cuban crisis, Czechoslovakia (Prague spring) and others. But we have to men-
tion that the Berlin wall was considered as a result of deteriorating of US-USSR 
relations, but not as a reaction on American policy towards Eastern Europe. US 
reaction on the Prague spring and its suppression by the Soviets was the same as in 
1956 on Hungarian events. The reasons (internal and external) were similar: elec-
tion campaign and Vietnam War. 
In the 1970s a new approach towards Eastern Europe was created: the so-called 
connection principle. It was aimed on the connection to the inside ideological, social 
and political problems, which already sharpened in Eastern European countries. As 
the US turned down their own attempts to create “problems” for the Soviets in the re-
gion, and was looking for opportunities “created” by Eastern Europeans by themselves. 
Theoretically American East European policy was concentrated on further “erosion” 
of the socialist camp and used to be a tool of influence on the USSR. In practice it was 
supporting of groups of dissidents (those who were openly critical about the political 
system and spoke about necessity of “pluralistic” society in Eastern Europe).
A détente policy influenced American policy towards Eastern Europe as well. 
One of the ways to improve relations with the Soviet Union was so called Son-
nenfeldt doctrine, according to which Eastern Europe was recognized as a “sphere 
of natural interests of the USSR.” 32 But the Carter administration turned down 
this doctrine: Eastern Europe was considered as a “buffer zone” (nobody’s zone): so 
USSR as well as US had a right to interfere to the politics of the region.
One more tool of American policy towards socialist countries was so called Jack-
son-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974. According to this amendment, those 
countries who supposed to be US trade partners and seek for “most-favorite-nation” 
trading status had to conduct free emigration policy. In that case domestic politics had to 
be subordinated to the requirements of international politics. According to this amend-
ment communist countries had an opportunity to: apply for the “most-favorite-nation” 
status and to receive American credits. But they had to change their domestic policy. 
This tool of American foreign policy is used even after the end of the Cold War.
In the 1980-s “crisis diplomacy” was the realization of the connection principle. 
The great example was support the Polish opposition trade-union Solidarity. This 
trade union was organized by Polish people by themselves, and US used only to sup-
port their activity in order to have a source of uncertainty in the center of Soviet em-
pire. The Carter administration assisted to Solidarity by sending literature and copy-
ing equipment. The main problem was to keep this support invisible for Moscow, be-
cause Solidarity would be proclaimed as CIA-tool, and as interference of US into the 
domestic affairs of the foreign country. At the beginning of Reagan administration in 
1981, martial law was declared in Poland and Solidarity became an illegal organiza-
32  Helmut Sonnenfeldt – State Department Counselor 1974–1977.
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tion. In that case “doubled diplomacy” was used in practice: (1) US’s official policy 
towards Polish communist government was economic sanctions (2): US’s unofficial 
support to Solidarity (equipment to print newspapers, radio Free Europe, money and 
so on). Even economic sanctions against USSR were announced, such as flights of So-
viet airlines “Aeroflot” to the US were cancelled; access of Soviet ships to the seaports 
were limited; Soviet trade agency in New York was closed; export of high technolo-
gies to the USSR was blocked; American companies were prohibited to sale oil and 
gas equipment to the USSR. All these facts once more prove that American policy 
towards Eastern Europe was determined by US policy towards USSR. As Peter Sch-
weizer in his book Victory summarized: the secret policy towards Poland was one of 
the reasons of the dissolving of the socialist camp and break of the USSR33.
American policy towards third world countries
The Soviet interpretation of American policy towards third world countries was 
similar to that one, shown in Eastern Europe. As the world was divided into two main 
parts – socialist and capitalist – former colonies were supposed to join one of two main 
camps. The desire of the nations which got a right to build their own independent states 
and not to be involved into the conflict of two superpowers became the main reason of 
the appearance of the Nonaligned Movement. But in the bipolar system of international 
relations it was mostly impossible. In Soviet approaches to the international relations 
those countries became the scene of battle between US and USSR. According to that 
concept the newly liberated nations had two options: (1) to be liberated completely, 
meaning to join socialist countries; (2) to be enslaved in a new form: formally indepen-
dent but really dependent from imperialistic countries (former masters). That is why 
Soviet involvement to the third world countries was interpreted as the assistance and 
help, American involvement was intervention and enslavement.
Conclusion
The Cold War period was a time of very complicated relations between two sys-
tems – socialist and capitalist – when a great number of different conflicts devel-
oped between military alliances, economic unions, international organizations, and 
nations themselves. But the much greater influence of Cold War era was made on 
the outlook of the Soviet people, because, until now, the Cold War point of view is 
dominated in some post-Soviet societies. Unfortunately the image of living in the 
fortress, which is surrounded by enemies, is still very prevalent in these countries. 
33  P. Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of  the Soviet Union. 1994.
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That is why attempts to describe what was the origin of such attitudes to the outside 
world is not only of interest for the people outside the former Soviet, but of more 
importance for post-Soviet nations themselves to understand why it happened and 
to make sure it does not happen again.
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Jaclyn Stanke
The American Perspective of the Cold War: 
The Southern Approach (North Carolina)
More than any other event in the second half of the twentieth century, the Cold 
War affected international affairs and societies around the world in countless ways. 
Given that, we continue to study it twenty years after its end. For the most part, we 
know quite a bit about the official, governmental views and policies of the two main 
adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union (with the latter more mystery 
remains, but the opening of archives from the once communist world has uncov-
ered much in the past two decades). The Cold War, however, was not just a contest 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. It involved allies and client states 
on both sides, not to mention nations around the world that tried to stay out of the 
fray but were still drawn into or affected by it.
Over the past several decades, scholars have looked at the actions of the super-
powers’ so-called partners—how they aided the larger cause (defending capitalism or 
communism, depending on which side of the Iron Curtain they fell) or even shaped 
Cold War events and policies, sometimes in opposition to what their superpower ally 
desired. Still, more needs to be done in this direction as frequently the focus is on 
either the “more important” allies (e.g. Great Britain or France on the Western side; 
the German Democratic Republic or East Germany on the Eastern side) or specific 
“flashpoint events” that bring in the “lesser” partners’ stories (e.g. the Italian elections 
of 1948; the Hungarian Revolution of 1956). In many respects, a sustained look at 
how the Cold War shaped the everyday lives of the superpowers’ allies and their per-
spectives is uncharted territory. This set of articles offers an opportunity to begin ex-
ploring, and then comparing, such multilateral experiences of the Cold War.
Also missing in the scholarship are perceptions of the Cold War within regions 
of the United States and the Soviet Union. While it is necessary to understand the 
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general outlines of an American or Soviet perspective, the peoples of these nations 
certainly never possessed any uniform viewpoint. Differences existed across place 
and time. Given that, this paper will provide an introduction to the American per-
spective of the Cold War from the Southern point of view, with attention centered 
on the state of North Carolina where possible.
Perhaps the two most important things which shaped the Southern approach to 
the Cold War were a belief in a limited role of the federal government and race. Not 
surprisingly, these two elements were present among Southern views at the United 
States’ founding. Since the American Revolution, most Southerners held a states’ 
rights position vis-à-vis the proper role of the national government (this is still 
true with regard to certain issues, albeit at times only in rhetoric). The Revolution 
had been fought to protect and preserve individual liberties from abridgment by 
a distant, central government that exercised its power by armed force. Though the 
revolutionary-era government under the Articles of Confederation proved ineffec-
tual, it still took some convincing, especially among Southern states, that the new 
(and stronger) federal government proposed under the U.S. Constitution would 
not infringe upon individual liberties and rights. Hence, to secure ratification a Bill 
of Rights was required.1 Also to ensure Southern acceptance, the Constitution con-
tained compromises on the matter of slavery. Most notably, the words “slave” and 
“slavery” do not appear in the document, but is implied with respect to the so-called 
three-fifth’s clause and the twenty-year prohibition on banning international slave 
trade.2
Many would argue the Constitutional compromises made on slavery, or perhaps 
the refusal to deal with the matter at the time, eventually led to the American Civil 
War. For a variety of reasons this conflict has been called the Second American Rev-
olution. Among them is the fact that the federal government of the United States 
emerged from the war as a stronger, more powerful government. The so-called Civil 
War Amendments (sometimes called Reconstruction Amendments) gave addition-
al powers to the federal government to guarantee individual rights and liberties (the 
Thirteenth abolished slavery, the Fourteenth provided “equal protection of the law,” 
1 The Articles of  Confederation and Perpetual Union served as the United States’ first constitution. Drafting 
of  it began shortly after the Americans declared their independence from Great Britain in 1776. Ratification 
of  the document by the thirteen states took place between 1777 and 1781. The government established under 
the Articles lasted until the second American constitution, simply called the Constitution, was adopted by the 
thirteen states during 1787–1788. This constitution has lasted until the present, though it has been amended 
twenty-seven times. The first ten amendments are known as the Bill of  Rights and were adopted by the First 
United States Congress in 1791.
2 The three-fifths clause refers to the compromise made at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 regarding 
enumeration of  representation and apportionment of  taxes. Slaves were not considered citizens, but they were 
counted as three-fifths of  a person when figuring a state’s population. This was important because representa-
tion (and tax apportionment) was determined by population. The greater the population, the greater number 
of  representatives a state had. The adoption of  the Thirteenth Amendment after the Civil War (abolition of  
slavery) nullified the effects of  this clause.
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and the Fifteenth allowed black males the vote). This was a reversal in principle 
from the Bill of Rights which had placed limits on the federal government’s powers 
with respect to individual and states’ rights. Also, thanks to the Civil War Amend-
ments a revolution in race relations, such that liberty and equality without regard to 
skin color, now seemed possible.
During the period of Reconstruction which followed the Civil War, the fed-
eral government sought to ensure the newly-granted rights of former slaves. Many 
Southerners opposed this federal intrusion into their lives, not only on the basis of 
ensuring equality of blacks with whites, but on the principle that the federal govern-
ment was overstepping its boundaries, abridging the rights of (white) individuals 
and usurping powers which had previously belonged to state governments. Once 
Reconstruction ended in 1877, these amendments, though not removed from the 
Constitution, were ignored and “home rule” returned in the South. In other words, 
states’ rights, especially with respect to race, prevailed until the Second Reconstruc-
tion of the modern civil rights movement (which itself occurred right at the mo-
ment when the Cold War was going global in dimension).
The Southern position that national or central governments were something to 
be watched closely as they could usurp power to the detriment of individual liber-
ties (a position reinforced in the minds of many white Southerners during the pe-
riod of Reconstruction), helped shape the image held of the Soviet Union. Prior to 
the Cold War, Southerners like other Americans saw the Soviet Union as the oppo-
site of what the United States was. Its form of government and early policies under 
Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin (especially its one-party rule, centrally-planned 
economy, forced collectivization of agriculture, and Purges of the 1930s) illustrated 
to many that this closed society did not respect individual rights and liberties or 
have a truly representative system of government. While the Soviet Union seemed 
inimical to the interests of the United States, it did not appear to be a real threat 
until the waning days of World War II when it imposed its form of government and 
way of life upon the peoples of Eastern Europe. Now it seemed as if the Commu-
nists were implementing their stated plans for worldwide socialist revolution and 
needed to be stopped. Given that, many Americans, including Southerners, quickly 
gave their support to President Harry Truman’s containment policy. Moreover, they 
saw the Cold War as a struggle between competing political and economic systems 
in which the very existence of human liberty was at stake. Many Southerners held 
this view for the duration of the Cold War.
Southern views of federal power likewise structured the support given to the 
national government to wage the Cold War. Unlike race relations, national security 
was within the accepted purview of federal power. Hence, throughout the Cold 
War many Southerners consistently favored hard-line policies toward the Soviet 
Union and supported numerous measures designed to stop the spread of commu-
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nism around the world.3 When the Soviet Union crumbled in 1991, Southerners 
believed themselves vindicated. The policies of containment and constant pressure 
upon communism had proven correct as the Soviet system crumbled and the Unit-
ed States “won” the Cold War.
Having outlined the elements which shaped Southern views in general, and 
thus what the South brought to the table when the Cold War broke out, this paper 
will subsequently explore how the Cold War affected Southern society. It will also 
broach the question of how this phenomenon affected Southern perceptions of the 
Cold War. The author, however, is left with the distinct feeling that while the Cold 
War changed Southern life (particularly its economic, political, and social develop-
ment), the Southern approach to foreign affairs, including the Cold War, remained 
largely untouched.
The American South consists of twelve states: Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, and Texas.4 Since World War II, this region of the United States has un-
dergone significant changes in its population, economy, and politics. In many ways, 
the Cold War helped propel these changes.
Perhaps one of the most notable changes has been demographic. Since the end 
of World War II, the population of the South has grown, whereas other regions like 
the Midwest have declined. Some of it has been due to natural increase, but most 
is due to in-migration from other states.5 Initially much of the migration was due 
3 Joseph Fry, one of  the few historians who have specifically studied the Southern approach to foreign affairs, 
makes this point in his introduction and presses it home in his chapters on the Cold War. See his Dixie Looks 
Abroad: The South and U.S. Foreign Relations, 1789–1973 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002), 
p. 4 and chapters 7 and 8. Fry notes the Cold War mentality was particularly prominent during the Vietnam War, 
though his study concludes with 1973 (the end of  U.S. involvement in that conflict). He further argues a South-
ern approach to foreign affairs, including the Cold War then, was less distinct after this conflict. This paper, 
however, will suggest just the opposite—a Southern approach continued until the very end of  the Cold War, 
if  not in fact beyond. Fry identifies several themes which structured the Southern approach to international 
affairs. Among those which concern this paper are: a commitment to regional interests, especially economic; 
partisan politics and loyalty; a deep sense of  honor, duty, and patriotism; strong support for defense measures 
and executive power in foreign affairs; a proclivity to respond with force or violence; and an activist, interven-
tionist approach to the world following the election of  Woodrow Wilson to the presidency, a Southern Demo-
crat, though a shallow commitment to Wilsonian internationalism (thus, a tendency to respond unilaterally and 
support the use of  force). This essay draws heavily on the strands of  thought identified by Fry.
4 The twelve states here consist of  the Confederate South from the Civil War, plus Kentucky which did not 
secede from the Union in 1861. Some might include other states, or parts of  other states, but the designation 
here could be considered the “traditional South.” The U.S. Census Bureau considers the Southern region to 
be these states plus Delaware, the District of  Columbia, Maryland, West Virginia, and Oklahoma. The Bureau 
does, however, break up the Southern region into four sub-regions. See Census Regions and Divisions listed at 
http://www.census.gov/popest/geographic/estimates_geography.html (last accessed July 7, 2009).
5 Bruce Schulman reports that since World War II, non-native whites accounted for larger and larger propor-
tions of  the Southern population, doubling the numbers in most places, but tripling it in Georgia and the 
Carolinas. He further notes new arrivals made up 12% of  Southern states’ population growth between 1965 
and 1970 and 51% between 1970–75. Also during the 1970s, the South drew twice as many in-migrants than 
all other regions of  the nation. See his From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and the 
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to the expanding military and defense needs of the Second World War, which then 
continued with the burgeoning Cold War. The advent of air-conditioning and the 
emergence of high-technology industries, driven in many cases by the demands of 
the Cold War, further propelled many American companies, families, and in some 
cases retirees, to move to the Sunbelt regions of the Western and Southern United 
States. The economic downturn of the 1970s also fueled migration from the former 
Industrial Belt—now Rust Belt—of the Midwest (like Michigan).6 Thus, many so-
called Yankees, ended up in the South. This population shift from the North to the 
South has resulted in a cultural effect which some call, “the Americanization of the 
South,” suggesting the South is less distinctive in character than it was twenty or 
thirty years ago (though in some ways that is debatable, especially as it concerns the 
Southern approach to U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world).
Another demographic change has been the South’s racial and ethnic composi-
tion (though much of that has occurred in the last 10-15 years, or the post-Cold 
War period). From the colonial period to almost the present, the region was pop-
ulated by white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs). Blacks also made up a por-
tion of the population with the introduction of slavery during the colonial period, 
though the distribution of slaves varied from state to state (on average, slaves never 
made up more than one-third of the South’s population, though South Carolina 
and Mississippi had black majorities). Many remaining Native Americans were 
forced west of the Mississippi River under the 1830 Indian Removal Act. Thus, 
for most of the nineteenth century, the racial demographic of the South, includ-
ing North Carolina, was primarily white and black. Because the South remained 
tied to agriculture, it experienced limited industrialization and consequently saw 
little urbanization or immigration until after World War II. Only recently has the 
region experienced immigration. Like other parts of the United States, the South 
has witnessed an influx of Hispanic immigrants. According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau, in 2007 North Carolina’s ethnic and racial demographic was: 74% white, 
21.7% black, 7% Hispanic (though many speculate the percentage is higher if ille-
gal immigrants are included), with various other groups, including Native Ameri-
cans, garnering about 2% each.7
Transformation of  the South, 1938–1980 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 159–160. In discussing these 
numbers, Schulman also notes that much of  the in-migration was due to changes in the Southern economy and 
that many of  these in-migrants came for high-paying, professional positions, whereas blacks and poor whites 
that held low-wage jobs made up most of  the out-migration during this period. 
6 Though migration to the Sunbelt can be attributed to many factors, the fact that some states benefited and 
others were hurt raises the question of  whether the Cold War created “winners” and “losers” just within the 
United States during its duration (and possibly after, as the Sunbelt regions continue to grow while the Midwest 
population’s is shrinking). 
7 These percentages add up to over 100% because individuals may check off  more than one race. See U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau State and County Quick Facts (North Carolina), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37000.
html (last accessed June 29, 2009).
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It is worthwhile to point out the above demographic information because 
alongside the perceived proper role of the federal government, race was the most 
important factor that shaped the Southern response to a multitude of things in 
the twentieth century, including its Cold War perspective. Until the modern civil 
rights movement, many Southerners viewed blacks as well as other racial and eth-
nic groups not from Northern or Western Europe as inferior. With respect to the 
former, the attitude was shaped by the institution of slavery, with the latter it was 
due to the unfamiliarity with other ethnic groups given the paucity of immigra-
tion to the region.8 During the Cold War, racial and ethnic assumptions were 
often the lens through which Southerners viewed developing nations (whether 
client or non-aligned states) in the decolonizing world. The Southern paternal-
istic attitude toward “lesser races” manifested itself in several ways. First, rather 
than taking into account the domestic or national concerns of its allies, Southern-
ers frequently disliked cooperation and instead favored an American-led unilat-
eral plan of action (e.g. Vietnam). Second, as the Cold War moved into the third 
world, Southerners oftentimes strongly supported foreign interventions to defend 
against the communist threat (e.g. Guatemala, Vietnam). Some of this was due to 
Southern assumptions that these nations were either unable to defend themselves 
properly against communism or they were unable to recognize the presence of 
communism subverting their system. Naturally, it can also be noted that South-
erners, along with other Americans prior to the Vietnam conflict, oftentimes con-
fused national liberation movements and their accompanying social reforms with 
communist infiltration when there was little to none. Finally, as membership in 
the United Nations by newly decolonized nations from Asia and Africa grew in 
the 1960s, Southerners who had already demonstrated qualified support for the 
institution became even less supportive of its efforts to secure peace in the Cold 
War age.9
A factor related to the South’s population growth and in-migration from other 
regions following World War II, has been its increased urbanization (though this 
may also be attributed to the changing nature of the South’s economy; see below). In 
1930, most Americans lived in urban areas, but only one-third of Southerners did. 
This changed after World War II and continued through the duration of the Cold 
War, such that in 1960, 58% of the South’s residents lived in cities, and by 1980 
75% did.10 Still, one may find deep rural pockets where life has experienced fewer 
changes over the last few decades (though this too is changing, there are still many 
8 Of  note, in the 1920s, the South was considered the most nativist (or anti-immigrant) part of  the nation and 
gave overwhelming support to immigration restriction laws that introduced the quota system, favoring North-
ern and Western Europeans. The system lasted until the 1965 Immigration Act, which Southerners opposed. 
See J. Fry, op. cit. 196-197 (1920s) and 255–256 (1965 law).
9 Ibid. 259 and 262 (regarding ethnic assumptions), and 226 and 252 (regarding the United Nations).
10 B. Schulman, op. cit. 3; and J. Fry, op. cit. 224. 
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rural areas, even some not far from metropolitan centers like Chatham County near 
Raleigh, the capital of North Carolina, where broadband internet is unavailable).11
North Carolina reflects the general trends the South’s economy underwent 
after World War II. Prior to it, as far back as the end of the American Civil War 
when Southern agriculture and hence its economy was completely devastated, the 
South became in many respects a colonial economy—extracting raw materials and 
producing agricultural products to be used or manufactured into finished goods 
elsewhere (other parts of the United States or abroad). After World War II, the 
Southern economy became more mechanized, diversified, and productive. Like 
other Southern states, North Carolina farms now produce soybeans and have ex-
panded their livestock, poultry, and dairy production (not to mention its food pro-
cessing industry, also like other Southern states). For a long time, North Carolina 
remained strong in tobacco and cotton production, but even that has changed and 
jobs related to these industries have seen heavy declines in the past several decades. 
The connection between smoking and cancer-related illnesses, along with the recent 
rescinding of tobacco allotments from the New Deal era, has solidified a move away 
from tobacco cultivation. Similarly, though North Carolina still produces cotton, 
it is no longer a prime region for textiles as mills have closed and jobs have gone 
overseas where cheaper labor conditions prevail. All in all, the move away from ag-
riculture in the South’s economy has resulted in a decrease of those living on farms 
(by 1980, only 3% did).12
These economic changes affected Southerners’ outlook on foreign policy mat-
ters, most notably the issue of tariffs. From the late nineteenth century until the 
Cold War era, Southerners consistently favored low tariffs and free trade princi-
ples in order to find markets for their goods abroad. Given the economic changes, 
though, Joseph Fry has noted Southerners increasingly became some of the strongest 
proponents of American protectionism in the post-World War II era. This change, 
however, did not come overnight and is instructive as to why the South gave over-
whelming support to the Marshall Plan of the early Cold War. The Marshall Plan 
played on Southerners’ strong sense of national honor and patriotism as the United 
States sought to prop up a free and democratic Western Europe, fearing that with-
out American help this area could succumb to communism. However, Southerners 
also recognized the benefit the Marshall Plan provided them—markets for their 
agricultural goods. As agriculture played less of a role in the South’s economy, a re-
11 F. Morgan, Chatham’s Information Highway is Made of  Dirt: Life in the Slow Lane, “Independent”, February 18, 
2009. Available online at http://www.indywekk.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3A287743 (last accessed, 
June 29, 2009). Similarly, another article reported that the U.S. Census Bureau placed North Carolina 42 out 
of  the 50 states in home internet access. See J. Drew, Census Bureau: North Carolina Ranks Low for Accessing In-
ternet, “Triangle Business Journal”, 3 June 2009. Available online at http://triangle.bizjournals.com/triangle/
stories/2009/06/01/daily48.html (last accessed June 29, 2009).
12 J. Fry, op. cit. 224.
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versal in attitude took place. Southerners now favored higher, even at times protec-
tionist, tariffs. Ironically enough, they often did so out of the same sense of national 
pride and patriotism.13
While World War II brought many economic changes to the South, the Cold 
War solidified them. Fry has found that from the nation’s founding, Southerners in 
general have been suspicious of centralized government, higher taxes, and strong 
executive action, fearing such things abridged personal liberty and states’ rights. He 
further notes that while this proposition held true for domestic matters in the twen-
tieth century (especially where social reform or civil rights was concerned), South-
erners were more likely to support a foreign policy that enhanced such things.14 As 
a result, both Washington policymakers and Southern politicians were able to use 
the security needs of the early Cold War not only to protect the nation but also ad-
vance the economic development of the South, historically the nation’s number one 
economic problem since the Civil War. The federal government which had been 
trying to promote economic change in the South since the New Deal, and rather 
unsuccessfully, finally found a way via “military Keynesianism,” for as Schulman 
rightly notes, “military spending, understood broadly, offered development with-
out political reform and social change.”15 In other words, to meet the Communist 
threat of the early Cold War period, the federal government was willing to spend 
a lot of money, and Southern politicians for a variety of reasons were eager to accept 
it despite the fact that in doing so they somewhat compromised their stance regard-
ing federal involvement in states’ affairs (something they would deny). First, the 
South accepted the money because it would help advance local and state economies. 
Secondly, out of duty, honor, and patriotism Southern politicians believed it was 
necessary to support a strong American defense posture to meet the Communist 
threat. And finally, the federal government did not attach strings to the money re-
garding social change in the South (i.e. workers’ and civil rights). Washington most 
likely did not because doing so might draw Southern resistance and thus hinder 
America’s national security, but also because advancing civil rights was not yet a high 
national priority (though it would become one as the Cold War continued on; see 
below).
During the Cold War, the South consistently supported large defense budgets 
and the region often witnessed more defense monies coming in than taxes paid out. 
The region was home to seven of the ten largest defense contractors; and defense-
related industries frequently spurred economic growth as new industries vital to the 
Cold War emerged (e.g. space program installations in Houston, Texas, and Cape 
Canaveral, Florida). The Cold War fueled the Southern economy so much so that 
13 J. Fry, op. cit. 229-230 (Marshall Plan) and 267–268 (protectionism).
14 Ibid. passim.
15 B. Schulman, op. cit. 109 and 133.
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by 1973, Schulman reports, “more Southerners worked in defense related indus-
tries than textiles, synthetics, and apparel combined.” Interestingly enough, while 
the Southern share of military contracts expanded from 7.6% in 1951 to 24.2% 
in 1980, the South received the lowest amount of funds for weapons development 
than other parts of the nation, which at least made it less dependent upon the so-
called weapons roller-coaster.
North Carolina differed from other parts of the South in that it did not receive 
a large volume of defense work. Still, defense monies made up 10-20% of the state’s 
income growth between 1952 and 1962. Instead of serving as the weapons arsenal 
or innovative center of America’s national security state, North Carolina provided 
a significant portion of its fighting forces, housing two air force bases (Pope and Sey-
mour Johnson), three Marine Corps air stations (Camp Lejeune, Cherry Point, and 
New Hill), and the army base at Fort Bragg (the largest military installation in the 
world by population). Thus, North Carolina had a place in the so-called military-in-
dustrial complex, but benefited more from its position in what some have called the 
military-payroll complex. Indeed, by 1970, the South was drawing one and a half 
times the national average in defense salaries. However, as Schulman notes, while 
military bases stimulated local economies, they did not necessarily foster economic 
growth in the form of new industries with high-paying, professional positions. Such 
was the case with North Carolina. To rectify that situation, local government, busi-
ness, and university leaders in the Raleigh area decided to establish the Research 
Triangle Park in 1959 as a way to draw innovative and collaborative research, as well 
as government contracts, to the area. It succeeded with the former, but with the 
latter it failed to obtain significant amounts of defense monies over the course of 
the Cold War.16 Nevertheless, the attempt to lure such funds radically changed the 
Triangle area (Raleigh, Durham, and Chapel Hill). It went from an economy domi-
nated by textile mills and farms to one driven by high-technology, such that today 
the Triangle usually shows up on lists identifying it as one the most educated areas 
in the United States (which includes percentages of the population with bachelor 
and advanced degrees; indeed, the area possesses one of the highest concentrations 
of individuals with master’s and doctoral degrees in the nation).
Like other Southern states, North Carolina gave vigorous support to presidents 
who favored large defense budgets to wage the Cold War. Along with the rest of 
their Southern brethren they tended, however, to favor budget monies that were di-
rected at military items, such as weapon systems and military training, over foreign 
aid. The South was suspicious of foreign aid to developing nations but also disliked 
military aid to Western allies. In both cases, Southern traditional fiscal conserva-
tism played a role as did additional factors. Regarding developing nations, racial 
16 B. Schulman, op. cit. chapter 6 (especially 139–150 for statistical information in the above two paragraphs; 
167–170 for information on the Research Triangle Park).
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and ethnic assumptions again came into play, questioning whether or not these na-
tions were worthy of the aid and if they would use it properly in the fight against 
communism (and even if they were able to defend themselves from succumbing 
to communism).17 In the case of military aid, it is possible this suspicion existed, 
especially in the later Cold War, because many of its Western allies had instituted 
social reforms and government sponsored programs like national health care, items 
which strengthened the hand and power of central governments. In that case, some 
Southerners questioned whether some of their European allies were vigilant enough 
in seeing socialism infiltrate their political systems or were in fact not Reds them-
selves. Such views were consistent with Southern sensibilities regarding the proper 
role of national governments. It was one thing to support a strong government for 
reasons of national security, but quite another to let it acquire power in the form of 
a welfare state.
While Southerners generally favored defense spending during the Cold War, 
they were less approving of efforts to accept the Cold War as a permanent, ongoing 
structure of international relations. Rather, in keeping with a strong tradition of na-
tional honor and duty, the Cold War was to some extent viewed like other, regular 
wars—something to be waged vigorously and won outright. Hence, they were suspi-
cious of efforts to tone down tensions or accept arms control measures. Southerners 
consistently opposed the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1968 Nonproliferation 
Treaty, and SALT I and II. Likewise, they favored building an ABM (antiballistic 
missile system), but opposed the restriction of being limited to one.18 Hence, they 
welcomed Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or “Star Wars”).
Over the last forty years, the South has undergone a dramatic change in its po-
litical affiliation as well. At the start of the Cold War, the South was firmly Demo-
cratic in national elections and had been since the end of Reconstruction. Today, 
the South usually votes Republican at the national level (especially with respect to 
presidential and Senate candidates). However, the reasons behind the change in 
political allegiance have more to do with domestic affairs than matters of foreign 
policy.19 Whenever the national Democratic Party took strong stands with respect 
to labor rights, social reform, or civil rights, it could not count on the support of 
its Southern brethren. The sea change, of course, came in the 1960s when Presi-
dent Lyndon Baines Johnson (a Texas Southerner himself ) pushed for great social 
changes in American life via the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, 
and the various pieces of legislation which made up his Great Society program (ten-
17 J. Fry, op. cit. 227, 230, and 251–254.
18 Ibid. 240–243.
19 While this is a complicated issue, in writing this essay, the author has come to believe that perhaps the South-
ern change in political allegiance from the Democrats to the Republicans, or at least its solidification, may have 
more to do with foreign affairs than previously thought. Further study would help clarify whether, and to what 
extent, any connection exists.
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sions, however, were already evident with the 1948 Dixiecrat revolt from the party 
after President Harry S. Truman sought to move forward on civil rights).20 Indeed, 
Johnson foresaw the possible damage done to the party as he signed these pieces 
of legislation into being, predicting the Democrats had lost the South for at least 
a generation. Sure enough, following the social and civil rights reforms of the 1960s, 
Southerners began leaving the Democrat Party.21 By 1972, Richard Nixon swept 
the South. Ronald Reagan, George H. Bush, and George W. Bush repeated this feat 
(although Jimmy Carter did take his home state of Georgia in the 1980 election, 
while Bill Clinton and Barack Obama were able to pick off a few Southern states in 
1992, 1996, and 2008).
By the 1960s, civil rights had become an issue in the Cold War and, accord-
ing to Mary Dudziak, forward movement on it increasingly became a Cold War 
imperative. Simply put, the existence of black inequality, segregation, and voter dis-
franchisement especially in Southern states highlighted the contradictions between 
what the United States claimed it stood for and therefore what the Cold War was 
supposedly about. Inequality and restrictions on freedom for African Americans 
made it difficult to proclaim American leadership of the Free World. Moreover, 
such things cast doubt on whether or not the Cold War was truly an ideological 
struggle between Western democracy and liberty and Soviet totalitarianism and 
oppression. Indeed, the Soviet Union frequently highlighted the disparities in the 
American system in its propaganda.
Dudziak argues President Truman recognized the problems civil rights raised 
in waging the Cold War and took steps to eliminate them. Because he faced strong 
opposition from the Southern wing of the Democrat Party, he took action where he 
could through executive orders (like desegregation of the military). He also had his 
Attorney General’s office file amicus curie (friend of the court) briefs in civil rights 
legal cases like Brown v. Board of Education, which eventually dispelled the “separate 
but equal” doctrine and led to desegregation in schooling. She further notes that 
as decolonization proceeded, more advanced progress on civil rights at home was 
required. Hence, President Johnson went ahead with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in part because it was necessary to wage and 
win the Cold War on several fronts: to make true American claims on being the 
20 Dixiecrat denotes a Southern Democrat who left the national party during the 1948 election and supported 
the States’ Rights Party candidate, then governor of  South Carolina Strom Thurmond. The word, Dixiecrat, is 
a combination of  Democrat with Dixie, a colloquial name for the South. Thurmond, by the way, started out as 
a Democrat and later became a Republican in 1964.
21 Schulman attributes the increasing number of  Southern Republican votes after 1950 to more than just race. 
Given his focus on economic change in the South, he notes the increasing number of  businesses, their em-
ployees, and native Southern politicians hoping to attract new industries to the region affected the turn toward 
the Republican Party, the traditional party of  business. What also stands out, however, is the fact that by 1980, 
the South witnessed the highest number of  young voters choosing the Republican Party. See R. Schulman, op. 
cit. 214–216.
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Free World leader as well as to entice newly decolonized nations in Asia and Africa 
to throw their support to the Free World side. Thus, the Cold War played a role in 
helping to bring about the progress made in civil rights during the 1960s.22
From the presidencies of Truman to Johnson, Southerners fought their Demo-
cratic Party leaders on civil rights, revealing again the importance that race played 
in shaping the Southern Cold War perspective.23 Southerners were quick to hurl 
the epitaph of Communist at anyone who protested or favored civil rights,24 a fairly 
effective weapon used to silence the opposition since the McCarthy era. Indeed, 
such allegations had been suggested even before the Cold War when the Commu-
nist Party of the United States had occasionally taken up the cause of black rights. 
By the early Cold War, however, many civil rights organizations were suspicious of 
communist motivations and, as Brenda Gayle Plummer has shown, frequently tried 
to distance themselves from any radical links to the past. Rather, many groups fell 
in line with the emerging anticommunist consensus in order to advance their cause 
with Washington.25
Though less effective by the late 1960s, there were still serious consequences of 
such charges. For example, privacy rights were infringed upon when Reverend Mar-
tin Luther King Jr., along with other civil rights leaders and activists, had FBI files on 
them, looking into whether or not they were communists or associated with com-
22 It should be noted that Dudziak has been unfairly criticized by those studying the modern civil rights move-
ment in America. She argues the Cold War did play a role and it did have an impact on the course of  civil rights 
progress, but she in no way makes the argument that the Cold War alone was responsible for this progress. She 
acknowledges that without the efforts of  civil rights activists putting the issue on the agenda, much of  it could 
not have been done. See M. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of  American Democracy (Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
23 It should be noted that this discussion of  Southern attitudes is centered on white Southerners. Black South-
erners obviously had different views on the matter. Moreover, this difference affected black Southern attitudes 
toward Cold War policies. For example, black Southerners were often less anticommunist in their attitudes, 
frequently less supportive of  American foreign interventions in developing nations (often identifying a sense 
of  solidarity in the struggle against racism and oppression), and more opposed to American involvement 
in the Vietnam War. See B. Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960 
(Chapel Hill and London: The University of  North Carolina Press, 1996), especially: 177, 184–187, 206, 223, 
and 316–318.
24 J. Fry, op. cit. 249.
25 In her work, Plummer examines the African American response to foreign affairs, refuting the notion that 
when compared to white Americans, black Americans in general held a much more isolationist view. She sees 
a much more complex picture (and connection) between African American domestic concerns regarding seg-
regation, inequality and racism and their attitudes toward foreign events in the twentieth century. In doing so, 
she examines many different African American organizations throughout the period, noting any communist 
pasts or associations of  some of  the individuals involved, but also noting that like other Americans who flirted 
with communism in the 1930s, many had already distanced themselves from Soviet communism by the time 
the Cold War began. What is of  particular interest, is her examination of  how the U.S. government actively 
sought to tame or eradicate the more radical elements within civil rights groups, thereby co-opting the groups 
and bringing them into the liberal anticommunist consensus which was being forged. See B. Gayle Plummer, 
op. cit. chapters 5 and 6 (especially 196–199 and 214–216 for U.S. government actions to tame the more radical 
elements).
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munists. In 1963, the state of North Carolina enacted the so-called Speaker Ban 
Law which prohibited public colleges and universities from allowing speakers on 
their campuses who were known members of the Communist Party. Moreover, this 
ban extended to anyone who had “taken the Fifth” in response to questions posed by 
a state or federal body regarding any communist associations and subversive activ-
ity against the U.S. government.26 William Billingsley has shown the real targets of 
the Speaker Ban were not communists, but civil rights activists. University students 
around the state, but especially those at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, led the fight against the law and brought suit against the state. In 1968, the fed-
eral district court in Greensboro, North Carolina found the law violated the First 
Amendment’s freedom of speech rights and ruled the law unconstitutional (though 
it was not officially repealed by the state until 1995).27
Southern attempts to use anticommunism to resist civil rights reform at home 
were ultimately unsuccessful. Having lost the battle over this matter within their 
traditional party, many abandoned the Democrats and became Republicans. Even 
though the South’s political allegiance changed after the 1960s, what remained con-
sistent was its stand on America’s Cold War policy. With the onset of the Cold War, 
a bipartisan consensus emerged, such that both Republicans and Democrats were 
committed to the policy of containment in all its permutations. Communism was 
seen as a dangerous threat to individual liberties everywhere and had to be con-
tained wherever it existed, by whatever means necessary. Vietnam shattered this 
Cold War consensus, though Southerners continued to adhere to its main tenets, 
albeit as members of a different political party.
The Vietnam conflict was both the pinnacle and watershed moment for the 
United States’ commitment to the containment doctrine. It was the pinnacle in that 
the idea of confronting communism in such a far off place which many Americans 
had never heard of before went unquestioned initially. It was the watershed mo-
ment in that, as mentioned, it shattered the bipartisan Cold War consensus that had 
been established after World War II.
When the United States first became involved in Vietnam, giving military aid 
and training under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, Southerners were wary of 
such involvement. This may seem somewhat strange, but not really when one re-
members they had always been suspicious of military and foreign aid. As the con-
flict truly became an American one under President Johnson, Southerners went 
26 This refers to the Fifth Amendment in the American Constitution’s Bill of  Rights which states no person 
“shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” During the era of  McCarthyism in 
the 1950s, many individuals who were called before state or federal bodies investigating communist infiltration 
“took the Fifth” and remained silent. At the time, and obviously even after in North Carolina, this was looked 
upon as an admission of  guilt of  either being a communist or having associated with communists and sup-
ported the overthrow of  the American governmental system.
27 See W.J. Billingley, Communists on Campus: Race, Politics, and the Public University in Sixties North Carolina (Athens 
and London: The University of  Georgia Press, 1999).
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along with other members of Congress in passing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 
1964, granting the president almost unlimited power to wage the Cold War in Viet-
nam. The following year, Southerners provided strong support for the introduction 
of American ground troops. In direct troop numbers, the South provided one third 
of all American soldiers who served in the conflict, whereas the region only made 
up 20% of the American population as a whole. Some of this may be due to the fact 
that compared to the rest of the nation, Southerners were more likely to be poor and 
unable to obtain an exemption based on university enrollment status. However, Fry 
has noted the numbers also fit in well with Southerners’ strong sense of honor, both 
personal and national, and devotion to duty and country.28
Throughout the war, the Southern people and their Congressional representa-
tives repeatedly supported presidential policies to ratchet up the means used to com-
bat the North Vietnamese. Thus, they supported the insertion of American ground 
troops, the heavy bombing campaigns, and the mining of North Vietnamese waters. 
If anything, Southerners had a preference for military solutions and loathed the 
constraints the Cold War put on American power and its ability to wage war against 
the communist threat, something that became extremely acute during the Vietnam 
conflict. Because of Johnson’s decision to wage a limited war here, the South was 
the section of the nation most critical of his handling of the war. They preferred 
Nixon’s initial policies and supported his plan to leave Vietnam with honor, though 
they rejected calls to withdraw from the conflict. When Congress finally made the 
decision to cut off funds, making it impossible for Nixon to continue the effort, 
Southerners voted against the decision in great numbers.29
As the war became more and more unpopular at home and around the world, 
protests grew on college campuses and outside defense-related industries which 
made the weapons of war. Though the South was home to a number of defense 
contractors, the ones located here experienced considerably fewer demonstrations 
compared to those situated elsewhere. Likewise, while there were student protests 
on Southern college campuses, in comparison to the size and numbers elsewhere, 
they were rather small. Many student protests on American college campuses were 
28 J. Fry, op. cit. 263 and 268–269.
29 Ibid. 231 and chapter 8 on Vietnam (especially 262, 269, 271–274, 287, and 289).
A big debate exists within Southern history regarding the region’s proclivity toward violence, especially in the 
nineteenth century. If  one accepts the proposition that for a variety of  reasons Southerners were prone to 
solving problems by use of  force, the logical next step is that during the Cold War, the South often supported 
military force in meeting the communist threat. Though the connection is still problematic, on several occa-
sions during the Cold War, Fry notes the South argued for the use of  nuclear weapons (Korean War, Taiwan 
Straits Crises) and favored either the threat or use of  military force (securing Western access to Berlin, Bay of  
Pigs invasion attempt). It should be noted here that not all Southerners or their representatives were in favor of  
continuing the war in Vietnam. Senator William Fulbright, an Arkansas Democrat, was probably the most vocal 
opponent of  doing so. Moreover, to a great extent, this introduction to the Southern Cold War perspective is 
providing overarching generalities regarding the general Southern opinion. Differences existed both within and 
between Southern states yet on nearly most Cold War matters.
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directed at ROTC programs (Reserve Officer Training Corps) that provided fu-
ture military leaders. While many universities dismantled their ROTC programs 
either during or immediately after Vietnam, Campbell University in Buies Creek, 
North Carolina, actually established its in the midst of the conflict. The University 
president at the time was himself a man of strong Southern honor and a veteran of 
World War II.30
American music from the 1960s is filled with anti-war songs, but even in popu-
lar culture, Southerners showed their difference. Country music stars Tom T. Hall 
and Merle Haggard, though not necessarily coming out in favor of the Vietnam 
War, demonstrated more sympathy for the soldiers and veterans coming home than 
they did with what many considered the hippie, dope-smoking student protesters. 
As Merle Haggard sang in “Okie from Muskogee,” “We don’t smoke marijuana in 
Muskogee/We don’t take our trips on LSD/We don’t burn our draft cards down on 
Main Street/We like livin’ right, and bein’ free.” Rather he was “proud to be an Okie 
from Muskogee,” where they still waved “Old Glory down at the courthouse, and 
white lightnin’” was “still the biggest thrill of all.”31
Once the Vietnam conflict was over, many Southerners took the position that 
the war had been honorable and winnable. Many claimed that had civilian policy, 
and especially the doctrine of limited war, not tied the hands of the military, the 
United States could have won.32 When Ronald Reagan proclaimed these very same 
sentiments in his 1980 run for president, he solidified the South’s new-found com-
mitment to the Republican Party.
Vietnam shattered the bipartisan Cold War consensus, though the South still clung 
to its main tenets. Following Vietnam, Democrats were often considered Doves. They 
tended to be wary of foreign interventions and supportive of policies that brought 
a modicum of détente in the Cold War. Republicans, on the other hand, were con-
sidered Hawks, suspicious of détente by the late 1970s, favoring arms buildups to re-
gain military superiority in the Cold War, and supportive of foreign interventions 
to contain communism, especially in the Western hemisphere. Hence, with respect 
to foreign policy and waging the Cold War, it makes sense that many Southerners 
30 For defense contractor protests, see B. Schulman, op. cit. 146; for Southern college protests see J. Fry, op. 
cit. 271–272; for Campbell University, see J. Winston Pearce, Campbell College: Big Miracle at Little Buies Creek, 
1887–1974, Vol. 1 (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1976), 226.
31 An Okie is a colloquial, somewhat derogatory, name for someone from Oklahoma, but in this song Haggard 
makes it one full of  pride and honor. Muskogee is a town in Oklahoma. White lightnin’ refers to homemade 
moonshine, which is illegal due to its high alcohol content as well as its maker not paying taxes on its production 
or sale. “Okie From Muskogee” first appeared on Merle Haggard’s 1969 album, Okie From Muskogee (Capitol 
ST-384). Tom T. Hall’s song, “Mama Bake a Pie (Daddy Kill a Chicken),” tells the story of  a wounded Vietnam 
veteran, now troubled by alcohol, coming home to a nation that thinks “the war is just a waste of  time.” The 
song appeared on his 1971 album, 100 Children (Mercury SR 61307). Earlier Hall songs spoke in favor of  the 
war, noting the Americans were fighting for the freedom of  the Vietnamese from communism. See J. Fry, op. 
cit. 270–271.
32 Ibid. 292–293.
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permanently left the Democrat Party in favor of the Republicans by the 1980s, for 
they represented Southern views. After all, Reagan was man who initially dismissed 
the détente process, sought to regain American military superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union, and argued for a strong defense budget to do so (he also promised to turn back 
the clock on federal involvement in domestic policy, also pleasing to Southern ears).33 
Again, the South showed consistency in its views on the national government—giving 
strong support to the national security state created by the Cold War and wanting to 
turn back the tide of the New Deal/Great Society’s welfare state.
Conclusion
The Cold War had a dramatic impact on the South, resulting in significant eco-
nomic, social, and political changes. Without a doubt, the second half of the twen-
tieth century saw the Southern economy move away from one based on agriculture 
and being labeled the nation’s number one economic problem to one dominated by 
new service and high-tech industries related to the Cold War and leading the nation 
in economic growth.34 Moreover, the Cold War helped propel changes in the south-
ern social system in which blacks were previously left out. While the Cold War did 
not give birth to the civil rights movement, it did aid it such that by the 1960s the is-
sue of racial equality became enveloped in the larger superpower struggle. Without 
advancement on true liberty and equality for African Americans, the United States 
could not stand as the leader of the Free World, especially as the Cold War moved 
into the third world. Subsequently, the domestic reforms of the 1960s, especially 
civil rights, altered the political allegiance of many white Southerners as they turned 
away from the Democratic Party and joined the Republican fold.
Despite these outward changes, the South remained fairly consistent on what 
the proper role of the federal government was (limited with respect to individual 
liberties and rights, which translated into a limited role for the promotion of social 
change; stronger on matters of national security and defense). This then affected 
the Southern approach to the Cold War. Throughout it, the Soviet Union and com-
33 It should be noted that as Reagan began to work with Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s on arms reduc-
tion, Southerners criticized his détente-like moves. However, when the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989 and 
the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991, many Republicans, among them Southerners, claimed it was due 
to Reagan’s policy to step up the arms race in order to bankrupt the Soviet system, thus finally bringing about 
the end of  communism and winning the Cold War. One still hears echoes of  this claim, as witness the most 
recent Republican National Convention in 2008. A work that disputes the idea that the Reagan arms build-up 
was designed with the intention of  bankrupting the Soviet Union and ending the Cold War is B. Fischer, The 
Reagan Reversal: U.S. Foreign Policy and the End of  the Cold War (Columbia: University of  Missouri Press, 1997).
34 B. Schulman, op. cit. 152. However, he also notes that while the South’s economy changed dramatically, with 
respect to average worker income the South still led the nation in lowest wages paid by the late-Cold War 
period.
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munism were consistently viewed as dangerous threats that needed to be stopped. 
By the later Cold War, consistent support for American military action or unilateral 
action still garnered large support in the South. In other words, constant pressure 
not diplomacy was what was needed to wage the Cold War. Even Reagan’s efforts to 
reach agreement with Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s were pilloried by Southern 
voices. Ironically enough, once the Soviet Union crumbled to pieces in 1991, South-
erners went back to Reagan as the man who destroyed communism by breaking the 
Soviet Union’s ability to compete militarily (and economically) with the West.
Thus, the author is left with the feeling that while the Cold War brought many 
significant changes to the South, in terms of perspectives and views held of the So-
viet Union, communism, etc. very little changed over the course of nearly fifty years. 
This then raises questions concerning the Southern view of America’s post-Cold 
War foreign policy and approach to the so-called War on Terrorism. Some of the 
loudest calls for the unilateral use of force in Iraq and elsewhere have come from the 
South. Furthermore, support for such actions has at times established a litmus test 
of one’s patriotism such that not supporting a military action is conflated with a lack 
of support for American troops and therefore one’s patriotism.
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Lee Trepanier 
Enemy Images, Evidence, and Cognitive Dissonance:
The Cold War as Recalled by Michiganders
Introduction
This chapter is a summary of Michiganders’ view of three Cold War events: the 
communist infiltration of labor unions in the 1940s, McCarthyism in the 1950s, 
and the Cuban Missile Crisis in the 1960s. Fifteen Michiganders from the Flint 
and Tri-city area in March 2009 were shown articles about a Cold War event and 
then were interviewed for approximately an hour about their recollection of the 
events. In the interviews, I explore three specific questions: 1) do Michiganders’ 
perceptions of Communists subscribe to an “enemy image”?; and, on what basis do 
they make such perception, if they possess it?; 2) do Michiganders have confidence 
in their leaders to meet the global challenge of communism?; and 3) do Michigan-
ders suffer from cognitive dissonance in their perceptions of Cold War and personal 
events? And if they do, how do they reconcile themselves with it?
The concept of enemy image—a set of negative beliefs or perceptions that a per-
son has about another’s country’s capabilities, motivations, political system, and cul-
ture—can lead to exaggerated fear of that country as well as create a self-image of in-
nocence where one’s own actions are not perceived as aggressive. Often individuals 
who subscribe to an enemy image and have an innocent self-image have confidence 
in their own political leaderships: a set of positive beliefs or perceptions about their 
political leadership being able to confront international crises. However, cognitive 
dissonance may result when new information becomes revealed that conflicts with 
a person’s existing beliefs and perceptions.
This chapter will see whether Michiganders had these experiences during the 
Cold War. But before we look at this, I will provide the political demographics of 
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the Flint and Tri-city area as well as a history of the Labor Movement in the United 
States, since this topic is not as well known as the other Cold War events: McCa-
rthyism and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Political Demographics
Michigan is the eighth most populous state in the United States with an approx-
imate population of 10 million residents. It has a large white population (81%) and 
a sizable African-American (14%) and Arab (Lebanese) populations. Its economy 
is dominated by the automobile industry, with education, agriculture, and tourism 
playing secondary roles. Although it has voted for a Democratic presidential can-
didate since 1992, the state continues to be a “swing” state with Democrats strong 
in Detroit and Ann Arbor and Republican strength in Grand Rapids and the rural 
regions.
The Flint and Tri-City area (Saginaw, Bay City, and Midland) is a racially and 
economically diverse region and is one of the places in Michigan that determines 
the state’s electoral outcomes, i.e., it is a “swing” region of the state for presidential 
elections (the Detroit suburbs is the other region). It is the birthplace of the so-
called “Reagan Democrat”: the traditional Democrat voter, a white working-class 
Northerner, who defected from their party to support Republican President Rea-
gan in both the 1980 and 1984 elections. A smaller but substantial number sup-
ported President George H.W. Bush in 1988, but they returned to the Democratic 
Party by a slight margin since then. Reagan Democrats no longer saw Democrats as 
champions of their working class aspirations, but instead viewed them as working 
primarily for the benefits of others: the very poor, the unemployed, minorities, and 
feminists.
Flint metropolitan population is approximately 400,000 and economy is domi-
nated by the automotive industry, as expected being the birthplace of General Mo-
tors (GM). Within Flint proper, the population is divided evenly between whites 
(53%) and blacks (41%). The 2008 median household income is $31,424.00. Be-
cause of the decline of GM since the 1970s, Flint has suffered from a decline in 
population and a rise in crime, with racial tensions exacerbated as the local economy 
continues to suffer. Flint traditionally is a bastion of Democratic voters but now is 
a swing city in the state, as discussed above with the “Reagan Democrats.”
The Saginaw metropolitan population is approximately 200,000 and economy 
also is dominated by automotive industry, specifically Delphi, which is one of the 
primary parts suppliers for GM. Within Saginaw proper, the population is divided 
evenly between whites (47%) and blacks (43%) with a growing Latino population 
(9%). The 2008 median household income is $26,485.00. Like Flint, because of the 
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decline of the automotive industry, Saginaw has suffered from both high unemploy-
ment and crime. Residents who live in Saginaw City vote overwhelming Demo-
cratic, while those in the suburbs tend to vote Republican.
The Bay City metropolitan population is approximately 108,000 and economy 
is dominated by light industries and tourism. Within Bay City proper, the popu-
lation is predominantly white (91%), mostly of Eastern European descent and of 
working-class origins. The 2008 median household income is $30,425.00. Bay City 
residents tend to vote Democratic.
Midland, the last and smallest of the tri-cities, has a metropolitan population 
of 82,000 and economy is dominated by Dow Chemical and Dow Corning, where 
both companies’ corporate headquarters are located. Within Midland proper, the 
population is predominantly white (93%) and well-educated. The 2008 median 
household income is $48,444.00. Midland residents tend to vote Republican.
Labor History in the United States
Although the first local unions were formed in the late eighteenth century, the 
first effective labor organizations—the Knights of Labor and the American Railway 
Union—appeared in the second half of the nineteenth century. However, both the 
Haymarket Riot (1866) and the Pullman Strike (1894) provided the federal and 
state governments an excuse to repress these labor movements. From these events 
emerged the American Federation of Labor (AFL) which favored local union au-
tonomy, limited membership to workers, and excluded minorities and women. 
A rival union, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), was established in 
1905 and supported anarcho-syndicalism, while a new political party, the Socialist 
Party, emerged as a political power in the Midwest in the 1910s with the objective 
of overthrowing capitalism. But a series of events—the Danbury Hatters’ Case and 
the War Labor Administrator during World War I in particular—provided the fed-
eral government the authority to crush the IWW and relegate the Socialist Party as 
a minor regional power.
In the 1930s the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) established the 
United Steel Workers of America (UWA), the United Automobile Workers (UAW), 
and other industrial unions throughout the United States. The CIO and the AFL 
attempted a merger between the two organizations but it failed. Nonetheless, both 
the AFL and CIO supported Franklin Roosevelt in 1940 and the war effort in June 
1941, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The unions agreed to a no-strike 
policy during World War II except in November 1943 when the CIO went on 
a twelve-day strike for higher wages, causing a conservative coalition in Congress to 
pass anti-union legislation that ultimately led to the Taft-Hartley Act (1947).
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This Act amended the National Labor Relations Act that prohibited “unfair la-
bor practices” on part of unions, such as jurisdictional strikes (pressure employer 
to assign particular work to a union representative) and common situs picketing 
(unions refuse to handle goods of a business which they have no primary dispute but 
associated with a targeted business). The Act also outlawed closed shops, permitted 
states to pass “right-to-work” laws, and forced unions to give a sixty-day’ notice to 
employers of a potential strike. It also required unions to come to the negotiating 
table during a “cooling-off ” period, as authorized by the President.
Both the AFL and CIO supported President Truman’s Cold War policies, in-
cluding the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO. Left wing elements 
protested and were forced out by the unions, with Walter Reuther of the UAW 
purging all Communist elements. Reuther also was active in expelling eleven Com-
munist-dominated unions from the CIO in 1949. As a prominent figure of the an-
ti-Communist left, Reuther founded the Americans for Democratic Action (1947) 
and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (1949) in opposition to 
the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions. He left the Social-
ist Party in 1939 and became an ardent supporter of the Democratic Party.
Since 1955, when the AFL and CIO merged into the AFL-CIO, the Ameri-
can labor movement actively supported the Civil Rights Movement and the orga-
nization of public sector (government) unions, which now surpasses private sector 
unions in terms of membership. The UAW is an example of the decline of union 
membership in manufacturing: there were approximately 1.6 million members of 
the UAW in 1970; now there is approximately a little more than half a million. Per-
haps the biggest and most recent blow against the American labor movement was 
President Reagan’s firing of the PATCO (Professional Air Traffic Controllers Orga-
nization) and replacing them with scabs in 1981. Thousands of employees lost their 
jobs, wages remained stagnant, and, most important of all, the nation’s airplane ser-
vice resumed without any glitches, giving the public the impression that unions im-
peded efficiency and best management practices. This negative perception of unions 
continued with the passage of NAFTA, the flooding of imported foreign goods 
and services, the rising attraction of right-to-work states for corporations, and the 
disproportion blame placed on unions for the recent federal government bailout of 
GM and Chrysler.
Labor History in Michigan
The history of labor in Michigan is the history of the United Automobile Work-
ers (UAW), or formally known as the International Union, United Automobile, 
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America. This organization now 
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represents workers in the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico; and, although 
originally represented workers in the automobile manufacturing industry, it cur-
rently includes industries as diverse as health care, casino gaming, and higher educa-
tion. It has approximately 800 local unions and headquarters is located in Detroit.
The UAW was founded in 1935 in Detroit under the auspices of the AFL but 
left the AFL when the CIO was established in 1936. The UAW was the first major 
union that was willing to organize African-American workers and found success in 
organizing with the sit-down strikes, first in Atlanta in 1936 and, more famously, 
in Flint on December 29, 1936. That strike ended in February 1937 after Michigan 
Governor Frank Murphy negotiated recognition of the UAW by GM. The next 
month the UAW was established at Chrysler as workers engaged in a sit-down 
strike. However, at Ford, the UAW was not established until 1941, after the Battle 
of the Overpass (1937), when labor organizers clashed with Ford security guards.
After the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the UAW agreed to a no-strike policy 
to ensure the war effort would not be hindered by strikes. After World War II, the 
UAW elected Walter Reuther at their 1946 convention. Reuther ousted Commu-
nists from positions of power, especially at the Ford local, and used the strategy of 
negotiating a contract with one major auto maker and applying to others to secure 
a number of new benefits for automobile workers, including fully paid hospitaliza-
tion and sick leave benefits at GM and profit-sharing at American Motors. Soon the 
UAW became one of the best paid groups of the industrial workers in the country—
placing them solidly in the middle class.
By the end of the 1960s, changes in the global economy, specifically competi-
tion from European and Japanese automobile makers, and management decisions 
by U.S. automakers started to significantly reduce the profits of the U.S. automakers. 
Membership in the UAW declined over this period as did the profits and market 
share of the U.S. automakers to the point where General Motors and Chrysler (its 
second time) requested a bailout from the federal government in 2008-2009. The 
American public, and Congress, blamed the UAW for the automotive crisis, point-
ing out the high benefits of its members when compared to workers for foreign 
automakers, i.e., a UAW worker receives $74/hour compared to a Toyota worker’s 
$44/hour. The Union also has come under criticism for setting up the controversial 
job bank program and refusing to cut its salary to match the salaries of workers in 
competitors, such as Toyota.
Communist Infiltration
Five interviewees from the Flint and Tri-City area were given two articles to read 
for their reactions. The articles and a summary of each one are below:
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“AFL Denounces Labor Disruption,” New York Times, 20 June 1941, p. 9
Representative Woodruff of Michigan wanted the President of the CIO, Philip 
Murray, to quit the National Defense Mediation Board because of communist infil-
tration. Because he has been doing everything he can to keep the Communists out 
of the unions, Representative Woodruff called for Murray to quit if the President 
of the CIO refuses to purge subversive agents from the labor movement. According 
to Woodruff, the Nazi-Communist alliance is attempting to overthrow the Ameri-
can labor and union system: “their purpose is to sabotage defense production, stir 
up industrial strife, undermine trade union movement, and organize a revolution 
against the United States . . . They betray the million of loyal, hard-working Ameri-
can union members.”
“Red Charge Fly in Flint Strikes,” New York Times, 20 January 1946, p. 8.
The UAW membership was concerned about communist infiltration in their 
own membership as well as in the membership of the local teachers unions. By not 
purging the communist influence in these unions, members worried about a divided 
organization. However, members also were concerned that the accusations of cer-
tain union leaders as being communists were part of a “Red Scare” tactic by govern-
ment and business to split the union. Both the leadership and its members were 
opposed to communist infiltration in their unions but also wary of accusations of 
their leaders being communist.
After reading the articles, the five people were interviewed for approximately an 
hour about their recollection of communist infiltration in the UAW. All five signed 
consent-release forms for the academic use of their interviews.
The demographic information about the interviewees is below:
Interviewee #1 Male, 88, Roman Catholic, High School Education, Democrat, Flint
Interviewee #2 Male, 76, Roman Catholic, High School Education, Democrat, Saginaw
Interviewee #3 Male, 85, Protestant, Doctorate Education, Republican, Midland
Interviewee #4 Female, 74, Roman Catholic, High School Education, Democrat, Saginaw
Interviewee #5 Female, 80, Protestant, High School Education, Republican, Midland
A summary of all the respondents’ interviews is below:
All interviewees recall a negative impression of communists, specifically the So-
viet Union and Stalin: “It was a scary time. We were getting all our information 
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from the radio, and we heard all the terrible things that Stalin was doing over there 
to the Russians and all other countries . . . just bad things . . .” (#1). Stalin is often 
referred to as “an evil man” (#2), “a threat to the United States” (#4), and “someone 
who was dictator and wouldn’t stop until he had all of Europe” (#1).
When asked about communist infiltration in the UAW, only interviewees #1 
and #2 answered, since they were members: “We were worried about them infiltra-
tion, not just the unions but the United States as well.” (#2). However, they were 
skeptical about charges that either specific members or their union leaders were 
communists: “A lot of things were said, but I didn’t know any Communists” (#2). 
“There was a lot of fear, but I didn’t know any [Communists]. I think you have to 
have evidence first before you can say someone’s like that.” (#1). Both interviewee 
#1 and #2 heard rumors of someone in their unions being a communist, but, as far 
as they could recall, nothing was done about it. The other respondents didn’t know 
any communists either, with interviewee #3 making the point that “I lived in a fairly 
wealthy neighborhood and things around seemed as if all were well. I didn’t know 
any communists, nor did I think any of family knew any.”
All respondents had confidence in the leadership of the United States to con-
front the communist challenge. “I had complete faith in the United States and the 
president” was a typical refrain from the interviewees (#1-2, 4-5). All interviewees 
believed that the United States’ leadership would be able to meet the communist 
challenge.
Michiganders subscribed to an enemy image, with all of them having negative 
impressions of communists, Soviets, and specifically of Stalin, who was referred to 
an “evil man” and “doing the terrible things over there to the Russians and all oth-
er countries.” Michiganders also had confidence in the political leadership in the 
United States to confront the communist challenge. “I had complete faith in the 
United States and the president” was a typical refrain from the interviewees. How-
ever, when asked about communist infiltration in the unions, Michiganders were 
skeptical about the charges and wanted to see evidence before making judgment. 
This is a form of cognitive dissonance: Michiganders were suspicious of commu-
nist infiltration as reported nationally, but, when specific leaders or members were 
charged, Michiganders wanted to see evidence furnished. In other words, union 
cohesion and the rule of law were higher values among Michiganders than a fear of 
communist infiltration.
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McCarthyism
McCarthyism was a period of intense anti-communist suspicion in the United 
States from the late 1940s to the late 1950s. During this time thousands of Ameri-
cans were accused of being Communist or communist sympathizers and became 
subject of aggressive investigations and questioning before government or private-
industry panels and committees. Perhaps the most famous example was the speech-
es, investigations, and hearings of Senator McCarthy and the Hollywood blacklist, 
associated with the hearings conducted by the House Committee of Un-American 
Activities. Ultimately, public and political support turn against McCarthyism, with 
Murrow’s See It Now, Army-McCarthy Hearings, and a series of Supreme Court 
rulings playing critical roles.
Five interviewees from the Flint and Tri-City area were given two articles to read 
for their reactions. The articles and a summary of each one are below:
“Movies to Oust Ten Cited for Contempt of Congress,” New York Times, 25 No-
vember 1954
Members of the Association of Motion Pictures Producers voted unanimously 
to refuse employment to any known members of the communist party and discharge 
or suspend without compensation the ten men cited for contempt to the House of 
Representatives. Major heads of Hollywood studios got together in a hotel for two 
days and vote to keep fear out of Hollywood.
“Mr. M’Carthy as a Symbol,” New York Times, 11 November 11, 1954
McCarthyism is defined as “the invasion of personal rights, the irresponsible at-
tacks on individuals and institution, the disregard of fair democratic procedures, 
the reckless shattering of mutual trust among the citizens of this country, the ter-
rorization of local civil servants—these are all elements of McCarthyism. It is the 
destruction of orderly government process; it is the destruction of the constitution-
al relationship between the equal branches of our Government; it is the assault of 
federal agencies most intimately concerned with the actual “cold war” or the po-
tential “hot” one; it is the contempt for the Bill of Rights and for the ordinary rules 
of public and policy decency. It is the encouragement of fear, the undermining of 
self-confidence, the pandering of emothalism; it is the diverse force of accusation, 
recrimination, and suspicion.”
After reading the articles, the five people were interviewed for approximately an 
hour about their recollection of McCarthyism. All five signed consent-release forms 
for the academic use of their interviews.
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The demographic information about the interviewees is below:
Interviewee #1 Male, 75, Roman Catholic, High School Education, Republican, Midland
Interviewee #2 Male, 81, Roman Catholic, High School Education, Independent, Bay City
Interviewee #3 Male, 81, Protestant, Bachelor Degree, Democrat, Saginaw
Interviewee #4 Female, 72, Protestant, High School Education, Independent, Bay City
Interviewee #5 Female, 62, Protestant, High School Education, Republican, Flint
A summary of all the respondents’ interviews is below:
Most of the interviewees knew about McCarthyism, particularly how it affected 
Hollywood, but were suspicious about the charges that Americans were Commu-
nists. Some excerpts from the interviews are below:
“It was a time of confusion, especially for me and my family growing up with the war 
and really wanting to trust our leaders, we expect them to steer us in the right direction 
and really they were filling our minds with bullshit, like McCarthyism. It made me feel 
betrayed, like I had no one to trust. He [McCarthy] wasn’t the governor of Michigan, so 
I think we were being represented all right, but if this man could pull a damn cover over all 
these people’s eyes, I just didn’t want to think what else could be done. It was a shady time, 
because real communists were out there . . . Look at the way Bush made all of us afraid of 
terrorists, and not just terrorists, but Muslims. We can’t even walk down the street today 
without looking at a guy with a towel on his head, saying he’s got a bomb or on an airplane. 
McCarthyism is not really all that uncommon or hard to make happen.” (#1)
“A lot of people were frustrated because he was out there accusing people for 
wrongdoing when he had no proof . . . If someone told you that your ticket holds 
the winning lottery numbers, you want to make sure you have proof first. You don’t 
want to get all squalled up over the situation until you see the proof for yourself. It is 
the instinct of human nature, we want evidence for everything.” (#3)
“I was a member of the U.S. Army. I was supposed to represent my country. 
I signed up with the army for one purpose and one purpose only: I felt I wanted to 
do good for my people . . . Many people were against McCarthy but were careful 
what they said. I was concerned about my family, friends, and army buddies. They 
were confused and wanted evidence. It reminds one of the Salem Witch trials. It was 
only when Edward Murrow’s See It Now that McCarthy had the tables turned on 
him. That man did not have good intentions.” (#3)
“I don’t know anyone that was touched by communism directly or indirectly. No 
one in my circle was effected. I read a lot about it, especially in Hollywood. Most 
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of it was bogus, just suspect, but not actually genuine. It was a shame how many 
of those careers were ruined by it. I was busy raising a family. The Soviets were ty-
rants and was opposed to the idea. People sharing everything is a bad idea. A person 
should work for what they should always have a free enterprise.” (#4)
Michiganders subscribed to the enemy image of communists, however, they were 
skeptical about Senator McCarthy’s charges that certain Americans were commu-
nists unless evidence was furnished. Still, the perception of communists as enemies 
did not change since the 1940s. Michiganders also suffer cognitive dissonance as 
they did in the 1940s: they knew of the communist threat as reported nationally 
but personally did not know any communist and therefore wanted to see evidence 
if someone was accused of being a communist. Interestingly, the contempt and dis-
trust of Senator McCarthy did not translate into a lack of confidence in the Michi-
gan political leadership or President Eisenhower.
Cuban Missile Crisis
The Cuban Missile Crisis was a confrontation between the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and Cuba that occurred in the early 1960s during the Cold War. On 
October 14, 1962, the United States reconnaissance saw missile bases being built 
in Cuba. The crisis ended two weeks later on October 28, when President Ken-
nedy and U.N. Secretary-General U Thant reached an agreement with the Soviets 
to dismantle the missiles in Cuba in exchange for a no invasion agreement. Khrush-
chev’s request that Jupiter and Thor missiles in Turkey be removed was ignored by 
the Kennedy administration and not pressed by the Soviet Union. Along with the 
Berlin Blockade, the Cuban Missile Crisis is regarded as one major confrontations 
of the Cold War which the Cold War came closest to a nuclear war.
Five interviewees from the Flint and Tri-City area were given two articles to read 
for their reactions. The articles and a summary of each one are below:
“President Grave,” New York Times, 23 October 1962
President Kenny imposed naval and air quarantine on shipment of offensive 
military equipment to Cuba. The President makes two claims: 1) the Soviets were 
responsible with “false intentions in Cuba”; and 2) the U.S. will act alone against 
Cuba, if necessary. Kennedy makes an appeal to Khrushchev for peace and calls for 
a meeting of OAS.
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“US Get Soviet Offer to End Cuba Bases, Rejects Bids to Link It to Those in Turkey; 
U-2 Lost on Patrol, Other Craft Fired on,” New York Times, 28 October 1962
Khrushchev offered an acceptable solution to the United States in a private com-
munication. The Soviet Union will remove the missiles in Cuba. However, the U.S. 
brushes aside demands to remove missiles in Turkey. As the crisis was escalating, 
a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft went missing.
After reading the articles, the five people were interviewed for approximately an 
hour about their recollection of the Cuban Missile Crisis. All five signed consent-
release forms for the academic use of their interviews. 
The demographic information about the interviewees is below:
Interviewee #1 Male, 84, Protestant, Bachelor Degree, Republican, Midland
Interviewee #2 Male, 78, Roman Catholic, Bachelor Degree, Democrat, Bay City
Interviewee #3 Male, 66, Protestant, Associate Degree, Democrat, Saginaw
Interviewee #4 Male 56, Protestant, High School Education, Independent, Flint
Interviewee #5 Male, 78, Protestant, Law Degree, Republican, Midland
A summary of all the respondents’ interviews is below:
“It was a contest between capitalism and communism. One of the points of high 
ground that I felt we took was the position we do not occupy and take over by force 
other countries. The Soviets were going into country after country: Poland, Hungry, 
Bulgaria: a series of them where they would install their own government and leave 
their troops there. We were essentially the knight in shining armor. Now that may 
be an exaggeration, but that was the feeling I had. Now whether that was fueled by 
what was released by our government, I can’t say. I’ve always tried to hear all the dif-
ferent sources so I can weigh in and make my own decision.” (#1)
“During the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, I was aboard the USS Wasp CVS 
18, an anti-submarine aircraft carrier. We were employed down by Cuban waters in-
between Cuba and the U.S. and our vessel’s purpose was to stop Russian ships keep 
them from to Cuba. We were down there for about a month and we stopped certain 
vessels and we didn’t find any missiles. We were close to all-out nuclear war. Real 
close. We had the ‘hands on the button’ so to speak. Russia was ready at a moment’s 
notice to fire their nuclear weapons, and so was the U.S. Most people in the country 
had no idea of actually how close it really was. It was very scary.” (#3)
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“I had big faith in President Kennedy at the time. He knew what was happen-
ing more than anything else. I had a lot of faith in Kennedy. He was a navy guy and 
he knew what was happening and was directly involved in the situation. Presidents 
nowadays do not have the courage that I believe that President Kennedy had. He 
was ready to protect the U.S. at all costs.” (#3)
“I thought that the United States was able to handle the situations. The Ameri-
can public had a lot of pride. I had faith that President Kennedy and his team of 
political advisors would handle the matter, but at the same time I didn’t seem to care 
much if it was resolved peacefully. Looking back on the event with the knowledge 
that I have now, I feel that President Kennedy handled the situation better than 
anyone else probably could have handled it. But, it really wasn’t my concern: I knew 
that the Soviet Union was a threat, and that there was a good chance that military 
force would be necessary to contain the problem.” (#4)
As before with the communist infiltration of labor unions and McCarthyism, 
Michiganders continue to subscribe to the enemy image of communists in the 
Cuban Missile Crisis and had confidence in the American political leadership to 
handle the crisis. But, unlike the previous two events, Michiganders did not suffer 
from cognitive dissonance in their national and personal perceptions of Cold War 
events. Because of the nature of nuclear war, Michiganders felt directly threaten and 
therefore affected by Soviet missiles.
Conclusion
Michiganders suffered from cognitive dissonance in two of the three Cold War 
events: communist infiltration of labor unions and McCarthyism. In spite of na-
tional claims by the media and prominent politicians, none of the interviewees 
knew any Communists. This dissonance was reconciled in the first instance with the 
value placed of union cohesion over accusations of communist infiltration; and, in 
the second event, the value of skepticism over Senator McCarthy’s charges of com-
munist infiltration. In both cases, interviewees wanted to see evidence according to 
the rule of law to see whether such charges were legitimate. The values traditionally 
associated with the United States judicial system of fairness, use of evidence, and 
the assumption of innocence before guilty were preferred by Michiganders over the 
values of suspicion, slander, and insinuation.
With respect to the questions of enemy image and confidence in their leaders, 
Michiganders perceived the Soviet Union as a threat to the United States and to its 
way of life and had confidence in its leaders, especially during the Cuban Missile 
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Crisis. In this event, both personal and public experiences coincided for Michigan-
ders. This would be expected, since a nuclear war would impact everyone in the 
United States. Although none of the interviewees knew any Communists, they still 
perceive the Communists as enemies as told by the U.S. government and media. In 
other words, the basis of Michiganders’ enemy is national and public in nature, as 
opposed to local and personal.
When confronted with the events of the Cold War, Michiganders clearly base 
their beliefs on the national organizations and public institutions. However, when 
these messages began to conflict with their own personal and local experiences, 
Michiganders resorted to rules of evidence, common sense, and skepticism to rec-
oncile their cognitive dissonance. It would seem, at least in the Flint and Tri-City 
region, the local and personal ultimately triumphed over the national and public 
during the early stages of the Cold War.
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